Fez no dia 30 de Março, 98 anos do início da Travessia do Atlântico Sul por Gago Coutinho e Sacadura Cabral. Uma iniciativa no âmbito das celebrações do Centenário da Independência do Brasil, tendo essa data (30 de março) passado a ser considerada o dia do Aviador Português.
Partida do Lusitânia de Lisboa
Embora o objectivo final tenha sido alcançado em apoteose, a heróica travessia do Atlântico sul não foi propriamente dita uma aventura plena de sucessos e boa fortuna. Pelo contrário, a longa distância de 8.383 quilómetros, percorridos em 62 horas e 26 minutos de voo, a uma velocidade média de 130 Km/H, foi feita em 11 etapas (início 30MAR1922; fim 17JUN1922) e utilizaram-se 3 hidroaviões “Fairey III-D” (o Lusitânia, o Pátria e o Santa Cruz). Durante esta travessia perderam-se dois hidroaviões (o Lusitânia e o Pátria) tendo a tripulação ficado naufraga no meio do Oceano Atlântico e, no segundo infortúnio, foram recuperados por um navio cargueiro Inglês quando as suas vidas já estavam em perigo. Pormenor curioso; o Comandante Gago Coutinho terá ficado tão agradecido ao Comandante do navio que manteve contacto com ele, tendo-lhe oferecido posteriormente uma cigarreira em ouro com a gravação do mapa do Atlântico e o ponto onde tinham sido resgatados marcado por um pequeno diamante – essa cigarreira esteve em 2012 exposta no Museu do Ar.
Chegada do Santa Cruz ao Rioi de Janeiro.
Outras travessias tinham sido efectuadas anteriormente; como a Travessia do Atlântico Norte por uma tripulação Americana. Porém, a Travessia Portuguesa teve dois aspectos únicos, que transformaram a aviação mundial – foi efectuada sem apoio de referências visuais externas, recorrendo somente à navegação aérea baseada na observação de astros. A Travessia dos Americanos tinha contado com o apoio de um navio de guerra posicionado a cada 100 quilómetros, que lhes ajudava a corrigir o rumo.
Sacadura Cabral era o piloto e Gago Coutinho o navegador. Para o efeito, Gago Coutinho desenvolveu um aparelho de navegação único, baseado num sextante e um horizonte artificial. Fazia leitura (em media) cada 20 minutos e conseguiu corrigir o rumo da aeronave na imensidão do Atlântico Sul, de modo a errar somente por escassos quilómetros, e não mais de 20 minutos, cada estima que fazia.
Back in 2012, when I started a long mission at the United Nations’ mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), I couldn’t help wondering how much money had the Taliban to support all the activities they sponsored. Not only how much, but also where was it coming from. The reason for my questioning was because I learned the Taliban had a proper Government in exile (in Pakistan) with ministers, cabinets, “Provinces’ Taliban shadow Governors” ,etc.; they also sponsored a great number of religious schools (madrassas), where the recruited children had not to pay anything and were had all they needed (food, dressing, accommodation, education, etc.) for free; and then there was, off course, the payment of the jihadists’ salaries, running costs of all their (many)insurgent operations, buying weapons and ammunition, paying compensation money for the families of the suicide attackers, etc. etc.
In practical terms, it must require a lot of Money – millions – to run such an organization. Sure enough I found that the yearly Taliban budget (for that year) was well over 400 million USD. That was the answer for “how much” … now I had to find “where was it coming from”. The information was right there, floating in every “open source” report. The Taliban
There were seven incoming flows to the Taliban treasury: Donations from friendly Islamic countries; voluntary donations from rich private people in the diaspora; violent extortion or ransoms from businessmen (allowing them to maintain their business/families); illegal taxes from the population in the areas they dominated; corruption over the donations (for development projects) by the International Community; and, of course, drug trafficking.
The “Shadow Government” would keep 275 million USD for running expenses and the rest of the money was to be distributed throughout their warfighting activities. It was estimated the Taliban military operations would cost them between 100 and 155 million USD per year.
The extortion of large amounts of money was basically done over the mobile phone operators (or else their antennas would be destroyed); civil construction enterprises (allowing them to carry-on building roads and other large infrastructures; minerals exploration companies; distributors of electricity and water (in urban areas); and all sort of entities (national and international) dedicated to implement field development projects and humanitarian aid. Even the transportation companies (fuel trucks & cargo lorries) were on the list. The schemes had reach the ridiculous situation that the Taliban would be payed to let pass the fuel and ammunition transports for ISAF (across the Afghan/Pakistan border) to furnish the very same ISAF soldiers they would be fighting against, on the next morning. In fact, the Afghan/Pakistan border was one of the most important revenue sources not only for the Taliban, but for all sort of insurgency groups, criminality and corruption schemes. It was said that the amount of money made at the border control to the Afghan treasure was absolutely ridiculous compared with other entities were making. As long as the money would flow, the Jihad and the religious fundamentalism would fade out.
As far as the illegal taxation over the population on the areas dominated by the Taliban, there were two types of taxes: 10% over the crops and/or commercial profits; and 2,5% over the personal/private savings. People refusing to pay would be targeted for kidnaping and ransom.
The Drugs trafficking was one of the most important revenues for the Taliban. It was estimated they would make between 155 and 200 million USD per year with that activity. That alone was more than enough to sponsor their warfighting expenses. The Taliban would impose special taxation to opium farmers and chemistry labs (for heroine production), they would be payed to guard and escort drugs loads and transportation; etc. Afghanistan was well known to be the largest producer of opium in the world, generating 3,6 to 4 trillion USD a year. Taken those vast sums into consideration, if the Taliban were making “only” 200 million out of it … they were not abusing the system!
Bosnia 1995 – On the 18th of August, it rained copiously the entire day and there was mud everywhere. With such inclement weather, one would expect the warring factions to slow down their activity; but it was exactly the opposite. One of the occurrences that marked the day was a sniper fire over one of the very few buses that were still running in Sarajevo. The bus was executing a very specific path, in a part of the City that was protected from the Serbian snipers’ view, transporting mainly (but not only) children to/from their school.
For me however, the experience that marked that day was a question asked by our neighbor youngest soon, which was boldly playing in the street and used to seek refuge in the UNMO house yard when things went wrong. Aware that I was a foreigner, the child asked his older brother to translate his curiosity:
– “How is the war like in your country?”
The child didn’t know any other environment beyond the ongoing conflict; therefore, for him, all other places should also have their own conflicts … especially if the people coming from those other places were dressing camouflage uniforms and wearing helmets.
There was only one game that kid could play on his street, which was “hide and seek”. He had to move fast, find the perfect hideout and not stay too long in the same place. He had never played football with his friends, on any other child’s play requiring a sniper’s fire carefree attitude.
No início dos anos 90 do Séc. XX, a ex-Jugoslávia implodiu num conflito fratricida. Uma guerra onde cerca de um quarto de milhão de pessoas morreram ou foram consideradas desaparecidas. Estimava-se que mais de um milhão de pessoas teriam perdido as suas casas, tendo a maioria das infra-estruturas do país ficado destruídas. No total, a guerra provocou cerca de dois milhões de refugiados.
Duas décadas após o início da Guerra na Bósnia, no dia 6 de abril de 2012, os 11 541 mortos da Cidade de Sarajevo foram recordados num impressionante evento. Colocaram-se 11 541 cadeiras vermelhas numa das ruas principais de Sarajevo e fez-se um concerto solene onde um coro cantou um tema intitulado – “Porque não estás aqui?”
Sarajevo, 6 de abril de 2012. Homenagem aos 11 541 mortos da Cidade – foto REUTERS/Dado Ruvic
Quando o conflito começou, a Organização das Nações Unidas respondeu prontamente, procurando minorar as consequências daquilo que foi considerado o maior conflito que a Europa assistiu, após a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Não estando preparada política e estruturalmente para resolver conflitos de tamanha envergadura, a ONU optou por colocar no terreno uma força de Manutenção de Paz, num Teatro de Operações que não tinha chegado a qualquer acordo para resolver o diferendo que alimentava a guerra.
Para muitos a UNPROFOR estava votada ao fracasso, uma vez que não iria conseguir cumprir com as espectativas das populações afetadas, nem com as exigências da Comunidade Internacional.
Para outros, a UNPROFOR foi crucial para o conflito Jugoslavo não se ter agudizado, ganhando tempo para uma resolução final e duradoura do problema.
Pessoalmente alinho com os que entendem ter sido a UNPROFOR crucial para que o conflito não se agudizasse. Mais ainda, entendo que a UNPROFOR lançou as bases para a evolução dos conceitos das Operações de Apoio à Paz da ONU; novos conceitos e posturas que viriam a salvar muita gente dos horrores da Guerra.
Confesso-me indignado com as imagens que vejo na TV, onde verifico que as pessoas ainda não entenderam a gravidade da situação que se vive. Foi assim que na Idade Média a peste matou metade da Europa. Para mentes medievais devem de se tomar medidas medievais! De nada nos servem as “amplas liberdades” a um metro e meio debaixo do solo, alinhados em cantões. O Governo tem de dar “Regras de Empenhamento” mais firmes às forças de segurança.
Os nossos governantes ainda não entenderam que “o povo” gosta de ver alguém com pulso a liderar a “maralha”. Talvez assim entendam:
PAREM DE SER POLITICAMENTE CORRECTOS!
“Mais vale o PS dizer nas próximas eleições que estamos vivos por causa das medidas deles; que a oposição vir dizer que morreram muitos por causa dos frouxos no Governo”.
Back in UNPROFOR 1995, the warring factions’ protocol dictated, before talking business one had to discuss fait-divers … and drink lots of Rakjia (local brandy). Meetings with Serbs were something worth remembering. They normally tried to speak English, as a gesture of politeness, but if we (UN Military Observers – UNMO) would not bring an interpreter, those meetings would have been disastrous. The presence of a Portuguese officer in the UNMO delegation was not very common and a good theme to start chatting before going into “business”. Portugal was a sympathetic country for the Serbs, because it was a small western European Christian country, without any particular interest in Bosnia. Furthermore, the Serbs in general were sport lovers and the name of the (famous) Portuguese football player – Luis Figo – would normally jump to the table. There were also a number of Serbian football players that were, or had been, playing in Portuguese football teams at the time, but I didn’t have enough knowledge of football to support those conversations. The very first time that I felt embarrassed with my lack of football knowledge, I promised myself it wouldn’t happen again and I took note of yet another lesson regarding negotiations with warring factions:
UNMO Patch – UNPROFOR 1995
Lesson Learned – “Learn about the sportive history of the Host Nation and its relations with your own Nation. It is not enough to know the Host Nation’s history and culture heritage, because no one will be discussing that at the negotiation table. Knowing the Host Nation’s preferred sport, its athletes and the correspondence with the Troop Contributing Country is essential to break the ice and start a profitable negotiation.”
No ano de 2012, quando iniciei uma longa missão para as Nações Unidas no Afeganistão (UNAMA), fiquei intrigado acerca da “capacidade de tesouraria” dos Taliban para financiar tantas acções político/propagandistas e ofensivas militares. Cada suicida garantia um chorudo pagamento compensatório à sua família, havia salários de inúmeros combatentes para pagar, aquisição de armas e munições, apoio aos campos de treino e o suporte de um extenso Governo-Sombra exilado no Paquistão. Em termos práticos, seria necessário muito dinheiro para pagar todas essas despesas. Cedo descobri que, somente para esse ano, o orçamento dos Taliban para as suas actividades mais prementes era algo nunca inferior a 400 milhões de Dólares Americanos (USD).
O financiamento dos taliban baseava-se em doações feitas por países apoiantes da causa islâmica; doações da diáspora afegã conservadora; extorsão violenta aos homens de negócios; impostos ilegais sobre as populações nas áreas controladas pelos taliban; e à produção/tráfico de estupefacientes. Para além destas verbas, os taliban também conseguiam desviar muito dinheiro dos milhões que eram injetados no Afeganistão pela Comunidade Internacional em projetos de desenvolvimento.
O Governo-Sombra Taliban absorvia cerca de 275 milhões, sendo o restante dinheiro entregue aos comandantes locais para conduzirem as suas atividades no Afeganistão. Estimava-se que as operações dos talibans custariam entre 100 a 155 milhões de USD por ano.
A extorsão de avultadas somas de dinheiro era exercida sobre produtores de ópio, operadores de serviços de telemóvel, construção civil, companhias de exploração mineira, distribuidoras de água e eletricidade, entidades que se dedicavam a projetos de ajuda humanitária e desenvolvimento e até a empresários de companhias de transporte e camionagem que tinham contratos com as forças da NATO – ISAF. Quase tudo o que vinha para o Afeganistão por terra tinha de passar a fronteira com o Paquistão e era aí que os talibans faziam uma boa parte dos seus rendimentos. As verbas que entravam nos cofres do Governo Afegão, vindo da actividade económica nas fronteiras, era uma pequena quantidade quando comparada com as verbas absorvidas pelos Taliban e pela corrupção de funcionários do Estado. Todas as atividades transfronteiriças dependiam de uma boa situação de segurança para continuarem a operar e, mediante pagamento, os talibans não incomodavam as suas vítimas económicas. Chegava-se ao ponto ridículo de, por interposta pessoa, serem próprios taliban a protegerem o transporte de materiais e combustível para os soldados da ISAF, com quem iriam combater no dia seguinte. Se não houvesse pagamento os carros cisternas de combustível ardiam na fronteira do Paquistão e os seus condutores eram chacinados. Se houvesse dinheiro a jihad e o radicalismo religioso eram, momentaneamente, colocados de lado e os transportes chegavam ao seu destino.
No tocante a impostos ilegais sobre a população, havia dois valores distintos, 10% sobre colheitas ou lojas comerciais e 2,5% sobre fortunas pessoais. Quem não alinhasse nos impostos arriscava a ver os seus familiares raptados e ao pagamento de resgates avultados.
O tráfico de estupefacientes rendia entre 155 a 200 milhões de USD por ano, o que incluía impostos sobre os produtores de papoila de ópio, extorsão a traficantes, pagamento de serviços de proteção a laboratórios de heroína e escolta/protecção ao transporte da droga.
A totalidade de dinheiro que era gerada no negócio de estupefacientes no Afeganistão era estimada em cerca de 3,6 a 4 mil milões de USD anualmente. Desta forma, se os taliban “só” lucrassem com isso 200 milhões de USD por ano, … , não estariam a “abusar” muito do sistema.
This new enemy – the COVID 19 – is using asymmetric and hybrid warfare tactics. But we’ve learned how to slow its advance, in order to gain time for the vaccination counterattack. It is a trenches warfare; and your trench is your home.
Stay home; think out of the box; you’ll find a way to have an operational product perhaps even better than your “original you”; stay safe, it’s time to be a Power Point Ranger!
Remember the aviator’s phrase: “It’s better to be down here wishing you were up there, than up there wishing you were down here.”
Bartolomeu de Gusmão foi um padre Jesuítas cientista Português do Brasil dos SEC. XVII/XVIII, que, em 1709, inventou o primeiro aeróstato ao qual ele apelidou (em patente registada) de “instrumento para se andar pelo ar”, ficando posteriormente conhecido por “Passarola”.
A ”Passarola”, tal como a reconhecemos na actualidade nunca existiu, não passando de uma interpretação popular daquilo que efectivamente Bartolomeu inventou – o Balão de Ar-quente. Essa irrealista representação gráfica, terá sido inspirada em algumas lendas do Brasil, e foi desenhada por um aluno de Bartolomeu para afastar os curiosos da verdadeira invenção.
Quadro da Passarola (sala VIP do Aerodromo de Transito nº1 (AT1) em Lisboa)
Em 1709 o Padre Bartolomeu apresentou à Corte Portuguesa o seu “instrumento para se andar pelo ar”, tendo feito várias demonstrações. Eram no entanto engenhos miniaturizados e sem qualquer tipo de controlo, tendo em muitos casos pegado fogo. Contudo, reza a história que em outubro desse ano terá sido feita uma outra demonstração em Lisboa (ao ar livre) com um engenho que já podia transportar um homem; demonstração que terá sido um sucesso.
Bartolomeu de Gusmão apresenta os seus protótipos à corte de D. João V (Painel de azulejos exposto na sala de embarque militar do Aeródromo de Transito nº 1 (AT1) em Lisboa)
O padre Bartolomeu de Gusmão foi autor de outras invenções de relevo, acabando por ter problemas com a Inquisição. Adoeceu gravemente e morreu em Espanha – Toledo – com a modesta idade de 38 anos, fugindo às Inquisições Portuguesa e Espanhola.
In ancient times, many borders were not clearly defined lines, but rather fortified neutral zones called Marchlands – or Marzbān in Old Persian (frontier protector) – where tribal allegiances to emperors defended the core territory of the Empire from rival powers. Such was the case of Marzbān Kabul – Afghanistan – between the 3rd and 7th centuries AD.
In the 19th Century AD, when the British Empire ruled over the Indian Subcontinent, Afghanistan was considered as an independent princely state, although the British controlled its foreign affairs and diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, Afghanistan was still seen as a buffer territory, between the Russian Empire and the British interests in the region, preventing the Russians to have access to the Indian Ocean. After the 1813 Russian-Persian Treaty, the British concerns of a possible Russian invasion of India, through Afghanistan, intensified and the strategic rivalry between the two Empires, over Central Asia, became known as “The Great Game”. The British tried an alliance with the Afghans against the Russian intentions, but failed, leading to the British military incursions of Afghan in 1839 and again in 1878. In each of these two Anglo-Afghan Wars, the British Army was completely annihilated by the Afghan tribal militias. Following the second Anglo-Afghan war, the Treaty of Gandamak was signed, ceding control of various frontier areas to the Afghan King and the British Empire. The British would pay a yearly amount of money (six lakhs of rupees) to Afghanistan but would retain the Afghan foreigner affairs in British domain. However, the east/southeast border between Afghanistan and the British India was not properly defined and, in 1893, a border agreement was signed between the two countries, known as the Durand Line.
The Durand Line:
The Durand Line is a 2,640 kilometers (1,640 mi) long frontier agreement, signed in Kabul in 2 November 1893, between the Afghan monarch – Emir Abdurrahman Khan – and the Foreign Secretary of British India – Mortimer Durand – fixing the limit of the Afghan and British-India spheres of influence. The Line was designed by Mortimer Durand, without considering the ethnographic reality on the ground, cutting through Pashtun tribal areas and, further south, through the Baluchistan region. After its signature, a joint British-Afghan demarcation survey took place, but only managed to cover less than one third of the boundary, due to security problems resulting from local tribal unacceptance of the border.
The Afghan kings, have always refused to accept the Durand Line as an international border, rather a cease fire or military separation line, claiming their previous territory that used to extend until the Indus River. In 1919 Afghanistan took the initiative to retake the lost territories of Quetta and Peshawar, beyond the Durand Line, starting the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The result of this war was yet another treaty between the Emirate of Afghanistan and the British-India; sign in 8 August in Rawalpindi, where the Durand Line was reaffirmed, as the political boundary between the two countries, and the Afghans received the right to manage their own foreigner affairs business, hence gaining their full independence.
The Durand Line was slightly modified by the 1919 Anglo-Afghan Rawalpindi Treaty and subsequently inherited by Pakistan, following its independence in 1947, becoming the modern border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, although the latest does not officially recognizes it as an International Border. In the mid-20th century the area on both sides of the line became the subject of a movement for Pashtun independence and establishment of an independent state of Pakhtunistan. In 1980 approximately 7.5 million Pashtuns were living in the area around the Durand Line. Several sources claim that the Durand Line’s agreement was meant to be in force during 100 years and that it has expired in 1993. However, that information is not mentioned in the (English version) of the agreement.
Why don’t the Afghans recognize the Durand Line as an International Border?
The Durand Line is probably one of the most problematic issues in Afghan’s political arena. For the Afghan authorities, and intellectuals, the Durand Line is an agreement for limitation of military operations, signed between the British-India and Afghanistan. It is neither a Treaty nor an International Border establishment; and, above all, it should not be valid for the subsequently formed Pakistani State.
It is not a Treaty because it has not been subjected to bilateral negotiations and it did not respect the several judicial procedures that regulate such pacts. Rather it was a unilaterally imposed document, by an overwhelming power over far less power and week regime, without even having been translated to into the language the Afghan Monarch could understand;
It is not an International Border establishment, because the Afghan party has never agreed with such a definition; and, although the Afghan Border Police does respect the line on the maps to exercise their mandate, there are no border demarcation signs on the ground to guide the local population;
It should not be applicable to the Afghan/Pakistani reality, because, being a military operation’s separation line, it was meant to be applied to two different armies in a completely different world order and, like in any contract, if one of the parts resigns the agreement (Afghanistan) the document is not valid and another version has got to be negotiated.
The Pashtun ethnicity, a culture that has the upmost respect for tribal and family bonds, was artificially divided by the Durand Line. However, over the past 118 years these ties did not fade way, by the contrary, the line was never a respected as a separation or impediment for (cross border) marriages, family visits, and tribal agreements or businesses. In both sides of the line, the respective governments have little influence over the local communities, and the tribal customs rule the daily live. Pakhtunistan (the land of the Pashtuns in both side of the line) became the major controversy regarding the Afghan’s external relations with Pakistan.
Another discussion point is the absence of Baluchistan in the agreement. At the time the Durand Line was signed, Baluchistan was also considered an independent princely state, with its own sovereign government. However, Baluchistan was not heard or signed any agreement regarding the division of the country. Therefore, for the Durand Line to be considered an international Border, it would have to be a tripartite (not bilateral) treaty, which was not the case.
According to Aimal Faizi, spokesman for the Afghan President (2014), the Durand Line is “an issue of historical importance for Afghanistan. The Afghan people, not the government, can take a final decision on it.” This opens the space for a potential referendum type public consultation. However, should that be the case, and taken into consideration the trans-border tribal issue, what would be questions asked for the people to choose? Accept the Durand Line as an international border (yes or no?). However, if the answer would “no”, what then?
The Pakistani position
On 09 October 1974, during the 2283th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, the Pakistani Representative at the United Nations, referred to the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and that Afghanistan had claims over certain parts of he Pakistani Territory (referring to Pakhtunistan). He further informed that at the time of emergence of Pakistan as an independent and sovereign state, a referendum was held and the population decided to become Pakistani citizens.
According to Pakistani officials, the Durand Line is fully recognized as the official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, such as it is for the international community. The problem resides in Afghanistan, which appears to be interested in expanding its territory towards Pakistan.
Why is it so important to recognize an official International Border?
The Pakistani based insurgency, operating inside Afghanistan, enjoys all sort of support from the “other side” of the Durand Line, enabling them to carry on, year after year, their military campaigns in Afghanistan. The same concept applies for the Pakistani Taliban, which are using Afghan territory as a safe haven for their actions in Pakistan. Should an International Border be officially recognized by both Afghanistan and Pakistan, with joint or coordinated border patrol/control forces, hence stopping unilateral military actions against the respective insurgent threat across the Durand Line (cross border shelling).
Illegal trafficking of all sort of products would gradually diminish, giving place to a proper, much needed, border customs activities and taxation. Up to $7 billion of Pakistan produce is thought to be smuggled illegally into Afghanistan each year. Implementing a proper border and customs control in Afghanistan would have a positive impact on a Regional scale.
Conclusion – From a geopolitical perspective, the Durand Line has been described as one of the most dangerous borders in the World. With more than seven million Pashtuns living in both sides of the line, any solution will necessarily have to take into consideration the cross border cultural and family ties. The solution would seem to be the official recognition of “Soft Border” status, enabling the population to continue its daily border crossing, while maintaining a tight observance on customs and security issues. However, a “Soft Border” solution will require that both Afghanistan and Pakistan would have to have a proper control of their own territories, which presently is certainly not the case.
OPen samento 