Terrorists kill 14 in a maternity hospital in Kabul

António Guterres – UN Secretary-General – strongly condemned the horrific attacks that devastated several locations in Afghanistan on the 12th May 2020. The most horrific (suicide) attack occurred in a Kabul Maternity Hospital Attacked, killing 14 and wounded 15 people, including women and children. Two newborn babies were among those killed.

Authorities reported 4 more Blasts in Kabul, with no known casualties. However, further attacks claimed scores of lives in Balkh, Khost, and Nangarhar provinces.

•    Amnesty Intl South Asia: “The unconscionable war crimes in Afghanistan today, targeting a maternity hospital and a funeral, must awaken the world to the horrors civilians continue to face. There must be accountability for these grave crimes, and civilians must be protected.”

•    Human Rights Watch’s associate Asia director Patricia Gossman: “A deliberate attack on a hospital is a war crime. Those paying the price for this heinous act are patients, doctors, nurses, other medical staff, as well as Afghan civilians, including children, put in harm’s way.”

The Taliban denied any involvement in the attack. However, on the 5th of May, the U.S. Defence Secretary – Mark Esper – said that the Taliban not living up to commitments under an agreement signed this year, amid signs the fragile deal is under strain by a political deadlock and increasing Taliban violence.

He added that he believed the Afghan government was also not living up to its commitment. The Afghan government was not part of an agreement between the United States and the Taliban.

According to Reuters news agency, the Taliban have mounted more than 4,500 attacks in Afghanistan in the 45 days since signing a deal with the United States that paves the way for a U.S. troop drawdown.

https://www.kobo.com/pt/en/ebook/bosnia-95

“Atrás das linhas do inimigo” – a história real

O quente mês de junho de 1995 chegou a uma quinta-feira, enquanto me encontrava de turno nocturno na consola radar do Centro de Controlo Aéreo de Belgrado, vigilando a Zona de Exclusão Aérea (No Fly Zone) da Bósnia Herzegovina.

A NATO tinha feito “air stricks” recentemente sobre as posições Sérvias que sitiavam Srebrenica, e o movimento aéreo Aliado era considerável naquela altura. Sabia-se que ainda havia muito material de guerra pesado em volta das zonas protegidas da ONU, e os aviões da NATO andavam literalmente à caça desses sistemas de armas.

Quando o turno acabou na manhã seguinte, e me preparava para abandonar o edifício, notei uma excitação anormal no pessoal de tráfego aéreo Jugoslavo. Regressei à sala para verificar o que se passava e reforçar o oficial que me havia rendido. Após questionar os controladores civis sobre o que se teria passado foi-me dito que um F-16 da NATO teria sido abatido sobre a Bósnia. Aparentemente, uma parelha de F-16 estava em patrulha de rotina sobre a No Fly Zone e, a um dado instante, uma estação de misseis terra-ar (Surface to Air Missile – SAM 6) Sérvia enquadrou os caças e disparou sobre eles.

Sistema (Sérvio) SAM 6; à esquerda o radar – à direita o lançador dos misseis. Foto de Carlos Oliveira.

Os aviões estariam a voar entre as cidades de Banja Luka e Bihac, próximo de uma localidade chamada Mrkonjic, quando um dos misseis explodiu muito perto de uma das aeronaves, destruindo-a parcialmente, e o piloto teve de se ejectar.

Olhando para o scope do radar podíamos ver o segundo F-16 às voltas apertadas sobre o local, transmitindo o código de emergência para que os outros meios aéreos da NATO fizessem “um fixo” sobre aquela posição. Passado algum tempo o F-16 sobrevivente abandonou a Bósnia e, de uma forma gradual, todo o espaço aéreo da No Fly Zone começou a encher-se com alvos radar. A NATO tinha enviado para a Bósnia uma considerável força de aviões de combate; com intenções de procurar e destruir aquela posição de misseis.

Este incidente ocorreu no dia 02JUN1995, em que o Capitão Scott O’Grady, da Força Aérea dos Estados Unidos, foi abatido sobre a Bósnia numa pacata missão de rutina, e que anos mais tarde inspirou o argumento do filme de acção “Behind Enemy the Lines – Atrás das Linhas do Inimigo”, com os atores Owen Wilson, Gene Hackman e Joaquim de Almeida.

As rutinas tendem a fazer-nos baixar a guarda

Durante vários dias as Forças Sérvias procuraram em vão pelo Capitão americano. O’Grady conseguiu sempre iludir os sérvios, tendo dito mais tarde que, por vezes, os combatentes hostis estiveram a escassos metros do local onde ele estava Escondido. Ele foi salvo numa operação nocturna por forças especiais americanas, que voaram a muito baixa altitude entre vales e montanhas com helicópteros embarcados num porta-aviões que estava no Mar Adriático. Desses voos … nem uma sombra apareceu nos radares; somente alguns aviões de combate, a voar alto, prontos para intervir caso houvesse necessidade de algo mais musculado.

#peacekeepinginawarzone

UN casualties in Mali

According to the French news agency “France 24”, several UN Troops were killed after hitting an Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) in Mali.  On Sunday 10May2020, three UN troops were killed and four wounded after their convoy hit a roadside bomb. 

“We will have to make every effort to identify and apprehend those responsible for these terrorist acts so that they can be brought to justice,” – said MINUSMA mission head Mahamat Saleh Annadif. 

Cessar-Fogo Mundial por causa do COVID.

António Guterres tentou; muitos acharam impossível mas a coisa pegou. Gradualmente, 16 zonas de conflito estavam a alinhar no projecto e vários Países do Security Council da ONU elaboraram projectos de uma Resolução nesse sentido. De repente, no dia em que se comemorava o fim da II WW, os Russos disseram que necessitavam de mais tempo para estudar as propostas e os Estados Unidos roeram definitivamente a corda.

Realmente … leva-nos a pensar que os cinco Países do Conselho de Segurança da ONU são também os cinco maiores exportadores de armas mundiais.

(EXTRACT OF AN ARTICLE ON – THE PASSBLUE independent coverage of the UN)

After six weeks of negotiations, the United States shot down hopes for a resolution to be approved in the United Nations Security Council on May 8, refusing to back worldwide cease-fires as the US continues to castigate China and the World Health Organization for the Covid-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, momentum behind tenuous cease-fires is vanishing, experts say.

The long-awaited moment for the Council to approve a resolution supporting the UN secretary-general’s March 23 call to pause fighting in war zones during the coronavirus crisis may be gone for now. The resolution had come close to getting through, it seemed, by Thursday night, May 7, according to some diplomats. France and Tunisia had circulated a redraft of the resolution, obtained by PassBlue, with compromise language about the WHO. The new formulation expressed support for “all relevant entities of the United Nations system, including specialized health agencies,” in obvious reference to the WHO without naming it. The organization is the UN’s only specialized health agency.

France brandished its diplomatic skills as a permanent Council member to get the draft put under silence procedure — a span of time allowing parties to object — until 2 P.M. Friday, Eastern Daylight Time.

Hopes were high among most Council members that the resolution would see the light of day by the deadline, especially because on Friday the Council was holding an enormous meeting, albeit online, with an array of high-level government officials to commemorate the end of World War II in Europe. The latest draft resolution — it has gone through numerous iterations — had overcome many obstacles laid by the US and China. Estonia was the first Council member to submit a draft resolution on the pandemic in early March but was swatted down mainly by China for including human-rights references, one diplomat said. Then, a French-led draft was circulated, focusing on the global cease-fire; it was eventually merged with one led by Tunisia. That version, with more changes, was the one put under silence procedure late last week.

Around noon on Friday, May 9, silence was broken, even though several diplomats told PassBlue that senior US officials had shown signs the night before that the US was on board. But on Friday, Russia also said it needed more time to consider the draft; as one diplomat put it, Russia woke up and had to insert itself into the process.

In rejecting the draft, the US State Department said that the Security Council should either proceed with a resolution limited to support for a cease-fire or a broadened resolution “that fully addresses the need for renewed member state commitment to transparency and accountability in the context of Covid-19.”

https://www.kobo.com/pt/en/ebook/bosnia-95

O Carro Chetnik

Quando se cumpre uma missão da ONU em teatros de operação distantes, vivem-se situações indeléveis que balizam as nossas memórias. Algumas experiências são mais marcantes do que outras, mas todas dignas de registo.

Recordo uma patrulha no bairro de Ilidza em Sarajevo – 1995 – quando nos cruzamos com um ícone do Cerco a Sarajevo – o Carro Chetnik [radicais sérvios]. Tratava-se de um antigo veículo da ONU, roubado de uma forma violenta dois anos antes. Era uma carrinha Toyota Hilux todo-o-terreno, do tipo misto, com caixa aberta e suspensão elevada. Estava toda pintada em várias tonalidades verdes e castanho, para dar um aspeto camuflado e tapar as anteriores marcas da ONU. Na zona de carga tinha uma série de armações montadas, que indiciavam o uso de uma metralhadora pesada ou de um morteiro. Nas portas do carro estavam pintadas as tradicionais cruzes sérvias com os quatro “C” e, na antena do rádio, flutuava uma flâmula com uma águia bicéfala branca. Tinha ainda uma característica sinistra que tornava aquele carro numa peça única: – sobre o capô to motor estava aparafusada uma caveira real envergando um capacete azul da ONU. Como se fosse o logotipo da marca do carro.

  • O Carro Chetnik - foto do Contingente Sueco na UNPROFOR
    O Carro Chetnik – foto do Contingente Sueco na UNPROFOR

Aquele carro era uma afronta para toda a ONU, devido à caveira e ao capacete azul, de que se contavam inúmeras estórias lúgubres. Contudo, até então, não tinha havido como forçar os seus utilizadores a retirar o sinistro “trofeu” do capô. Os seus ocupantes eram extremamente agressivos e qualquer abordagem teria de ser feita com o uso da força.

O nosso carro cruzou-se com o carro Chetnik nas ruas enlameadas do bairro sérvio de Sarajevo. O Carro Chetnik estancou imediatamente o seu movimento e, do seu interior, saíram vários homens de meia-idade, com os cabelos desalinhados e longas barbas (característica dos Chetniks), envergando velhos camuflados Jugoslavos e com as suas Kalashnikovs em riste.

A presença de um veículo de Observadores Militares da ONU naquelas paragens não era apreciada pelos combatentes sérvios, os quais fizeram questão de o demonstrar agressivamente. Como continuei a conduzir sem qualquer intenção de reduzir a marcha, os milicianos Sérvios voltaram a embarcar no carro Chetnik e seguiram-nos. Nessa altura decidi apressar a marcha e chegar rapidamente ao checkpoint da ONU que marcava o limite da zona Sérvia de Sarajevo da zona. Os militares franceses que guarneciam aquele checkpoint estavam bem armados e eram um fator dissuasor de peso.

Quando o Carro Chetnik desapareceu do nosso retrovisor, tanto eu como os meus companheiros no carro da ONU suspirámos de alívio. Uma curta mas intensa experiência, que felizmente não passou de um susto.

#peacekeepinginawarzone

Ilidza’s Chetnik Car (Bosnia 1995)

In October 1995, during the days when the Dayton Agreements were being discussed, I was driving through Sarajevo’s Serb neighborhood of Ilidza, providing situation awareness to a recently arrived UN Military Observer (UNMO), when we saw something simultaneously danger and unique – “The Chetnik Car”. That was something not all UNPROFOR staff had the chance to see … and the blue helmets that had actually seen it were horrified with the scene.

The name Chetnik invoked an old 19th Century Serbian Monarchy paramilitary organization, created to fight the Ottoman Empire. The name was used to unite the Serbs during the Balkan War, the First- and Second-Word Wars. Finally, on the Yugoslav conflict it was used to define Serb nationalist hardliners.

The Chetnik Car was a UN stolen pickup truck, painted of green camouflage with the Serbian crosses painted on the doors, exhibiting a real human skull wearing a blue helmet on the vehicle’s hood. On the back open cargo bay it had a heavy machine gun installed, and seats for an assault team. On the radio antenna of the vehicle there was a flag with the Serbian double-headed white eagle.

Of course, the skull with the blue helmet was the most significant message of that car – they hated UNPROFOR. The mere existence of the Chetnik Car was an outrage to the UN, but its users were radical fighters, just waiting for an excuse to engage the blue helmets in combat. The Serb authorities wouldn’t arrest them and for UNPROFOR to cease the car, it would have to use lethal force, which was not going to happen.

We were inside of an overloaded Toyota Land Cruiser, driving slowly among the mortar craters of Ilidza streets. When we crossed our path with the Chetnik Car, several fighters, wearing black tactical uniforms, moved out of the car towards the UNMO vehicle pointing their rifles.

We just kept moving slowly but steadily away from Ilidza towards the French checkpoint at the entrance of Sarajevo.  The Chetniks demonstrated very noisily their disapproval for UN presence in Ilidza, but let us go through, because UNMO officers operate unarmed; hence we were not worth engaging.

Having the Chetnik Car on our tail was a distinctive experience; not to be repeated again.

#Peacekeepinginawarzone

The path to Dayton’s Agreements (Bosnia 1995)

In the beginning of October 1995, it was common knowledge that the US Administration’s Representative for the Balkans – Richard Holbrooke – was negotiating a definitive Cease Fire Agreement, which could lead to a permanent Peace Agreement.

People remained sceptical, because it would probably be just another cease fire agreement, like many others before; some of them remained in force for 42 hours or, at most, until the snow cloak that covered the outskirts of Sarajevo was gone.

However, the American deal introduced a “clever nuance”: – the reestablishment of water, gas and electricity to Sarajevo. The Bosnian population desperately needed those services back in their houses; therefore, they demanded their own authorities to respect those negotiations. With such pressure, the ABiH soldiers had to keep quiet and not challenge the VRS to retaliate; and that was the real game changer.

What the Americans did was exactly what needed to be done. They forced the Host Nation population to realize that their problems had to be solved by them … not by foreign institutions, such as the UN, NATO or the OSCE. The internationals were there to help, not to solve. In the words of Ambassador Cutileiro – the initial dealer of European Union for the Yugoslav conflict:

– “We can only help them, if they want to be helped!”

The American diplomacy managed to close the deal with all three parts, and the date for “The Cease Fire Agreement” to be in force was the 10th of October 1995. In UNPROFOR, nobody needed a “Crystal Ball” to know who was going to survey those future Agreements.

Reading a crystal ball for the implementation of future agreements in Bosnia

With the arrival of the autumn season, and some chilly weather, so did the water supply to the houses plumbing and most public places in Sarajevo. The Serbs were sticking with the agreements and Sarajevo population could go back to certain bourgeois acts, such as flushing the toilet. There was no more need to go out to the tunnels for the replenishment of the house’s water tanks. Richard Holbrooke was a hero in Sarajevo.

Field mission Lessons Learned: – Group Work versus Team Work

Military personnel deployed in the Theater of Operations should take into account the differences between Group Work and Team Work. Both cases of cooperative work are necessary but they are different and should be applied in different contexts. The differentiating factor is the TASK.

In the first case (Group Work) everybody has approximately the same task, moving in unison to reach the Crew’s common goal.

In the latter case (Team Work) each one has a different task to accomplish, and only with the accomplishment of all different tasks can the Crew achieve its common goal.

Pending on the situation, the same people can do the different works. Group Work is used in massive “all together” action/effort; whilst while Team Work is used in problem solving of technical aspects and decision making assessments.

It is for the leadership to decide which line of work should be followed, and assign the necessary resources.

Plano de evacuação da ONU (Eleições Angolas 1992)

Durante as Primeiras Eleições Livres Angolanas, que decorreram nos dias 29 e 30 de Setembro de 1992, os Angolanos votaram em massa, ultrapassando as previsões mais optimistas, com 92% dos eleitores inscritos (4 milhões e 400 mil pessoas) a exercerem pela primeira vez o dever/direito de voto. O número surpreendeu, já que se admitia uma taxa de abstenção na casa dos 20% a 30%. Os angolanos escolhiam entre 19 partidos, quem os iria governar.

No dia 01 de Outubro, depois do ato eleitoral, era a loucura total nos vários aeródromos espalhados pelo País, onde 10 oficiais da Força Aérea Portuguesa ao serviço da ONU, procuravam coordenar a operação aérea de suporte eleitoral. Todas aquelas urnas de voto tinham de ser rapidamente retiradas dos milhares de locais onde haviam sido colocadas por helicóptero, e reenviadas de imediato para Luanda em C-130. O que havia levado semanas a montar, teria de levar agora horas a desmontar.

Conforme os cargueiros aéreos iam levando as urnas de voto para Luanda, os votos no seu interior eram contados. Os resultados eleitorais, segundo os acordos de Bicesse, só deveriam ser formalmente anunciados no dia 08 de Outubro. Contudo, a comunicação social soube das contagens parciais e divulgou-as.

No dia 3 de Outubro, Jonas Savimbi (então líder da UNITA) dirigiu uma «Mensagem à Nação», na qual expressava que não aceitava os resultados das eleições, por ter havido fraude.

A violência estalou nas ruas da Capital e o conflito reacendeu-se por todo o País. A organização para ONU encarregada pelo apoio às eleições – Programa da ONU para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD/UNDP) – decidiu ativar o plano de evacuação que tinha elaborado e chamar para Luanda os 10 oficiais da FAP que estavam colocados noutras tantas Províncias Angolanos.

Após a chegada de todos os oficiais da FAP a Luanda, os responsáveis do PNUD fizeram uma avaliação da situação de segurança. Aparentemente as Forças Governamentais continuavam a ter o controlo da situação em Luanda, mas o clima de Guerra Civil tinha definitivamente regressado a Angola, e, no dia 8 de Outubro, o PND decidiu ativar o plano de “Evacuação Internacional”.

Os 10 militares portugueses foram chamados ao Quartel-General do PUND em Luanda e receberam as instruções desse “Plano”. Para admiração do grupo, o tal “Plano” consistia em entregar a cada um o dinheiro (cash) do preço de uma passagem aérea para Lisboa; um aperto de mão com um agradecimento (escrito) pelo trabalho bem efectuado; e um “Adeus até à próxima”!

Nesse mesmo dia, andava perdido pelas ruas de Luanda um grupo de 10 portugueses, com 20.000 dólares numa carteira, à procura de uma agência de viagens que “ainda” tivesse 10 lugares num avião para fora de Angola, de preferência com uma ligação para Lisboa. Não era bem este tipo de “PLANO DE EVACUAÇÃO” que os oficiais Portugueses estavam à espera.

Obviamente que não foi tarefa fácil, porque todos os voos estavam esgotados. Quando já começavam a ficar desesperados, lá conseguiram um voo num voo para esse mesmo final de tarde, num Boeing 747 francês, em direcção a Paris.

Cerca de 20 minutos após a descolagem da capital de Angola, o comandante de bordo transmitiu no sistema de som da aeronave a seguinte mensagem:

– Caríssimos passageiros, informo que o Aeroporto de Luanda acaba de ser encerrado a todo o tráfego aéreo até futuras instruções. Aparentemente fomos um dos últimos aviões comerciais a sair de Angola”.

Tinha recomeçado a guerra civil em Angola, a qual só viria a finalizar em 22/02/2002 com a morte de Jonas Savimbi, numa região próxima de Luena, em Lucusse.

Field mission Lessons Learned – “Runaway Bags”

In a UN mission, when one person less expects, he/she will/may have to stay away from the main Unit, sometimes for several days. In a conflict zone, the peacekeeper should not only plan to have his/her gear prepared for an unexpected stay, but also for an unexpected evacuation of the UN compound.

That brings about the issue of “Runaway Bags”; something to have permanently ready and close-by both at the accommodation’s doorstep, and in a trip.

Runaway Bags are no more than a collection of stuff someone may need in an emergency situation. Its “packing-up” is an individual responsibility and it should be prepared as soon as possible after arriving to the mission area. Everything should fit inside a backpack, and kept close to the door of the individual accommodation, in case there is an attack and that person has to “runaway”; or to take along in a routine trip/patrol (because we always know how they start … but we never know how they end).

Do not go on patrol without your “Runaway Bag”. You know how it starts but you don’t know how it ends!

The content varies with each person and with each mission area. Obviously a “runaway bag” made for the desert will not have the same content of that one made for the snowy mountain.  However, overall, it should not weigh more than 15 kilos and should contemplate four areas of concern: First Aid; Survival; Food and Hygiene. The difficult part is to select how much of each article should go inside, in order to keep the backpack under the 15 kilos.

The First Aid section should consider having: the medicines/prescriptions that specific person is eventually taking;  bandages and compresses; duct tape; a strangler garrotte; condom (it has multiple uses); anti exposure cream (sun and cold); band-aids; pharmacy disinfectant; water purification pills; insect repellent.

The Survival component should consider having: both local and hard currency money (because there are no free runaways); documents and photocopy of the documents; multifunction knife; flashlight; lighter and/or matches (fire); compass; small radio transistor (to hear the news); spare batteries for all the equipment taken; small mirror; glow sticks; notebook with pen/pencil; toilet paper (half roll compressed); whistle; sleeping bag; rope (10m); hat; rain cover; Walkie-Talkie (with mission frequency); one change of underwear..

The food section should have one litre of water (canteen); a combat ration; energy bars.

The personal hygiene should consider including: a small soap bar; dental cleaning material; some wet cleaning wipes.

During my missions, in several occasions I’ve regretted not paying enough attention to this matter but, believe me, it’s worth investing sometime right at the start, and then it’s done for most of the mission’s duration.

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