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News media War Correspondents in Bosnia – “If it bleeds, it leads”

By the end of November 1995, when people were already starting to walk around in Sarajevo’s streets, due to the recent Cease Fire Agreement, I noticed a marble plaque on a wall, at Marshal Tito’s Avenue, that said:

–“Truth was the first casualty on the fratricide war of Bosnia”.

It was said that the plaque had been put there by a small group of Sarajevo’s intellectuals, who had managed to elude the snipers.

The origin of that famous phrase is attributed to the US Senator Hiram Johnson (1918), when he referred to the misinformation campaigns during WW I, and the way it influenced the results on the battlefield.

The very same phrase applied perfectly to the ex-Yugoslavian conflicts. Truth had been suffocated under the political arguments of each opposing faction. The Serbs had lost the media/information battle, and that made all the difference in the result of Bosnia’s (and Krajina) war. In modern times, one could win all battles and still lose the war, if he couldn’t tell his version of the story; fast. The Bosnian muslin understood it, and dominated the media battle field; thus influencing the decisions in the confrontation lines. The way to deal with warfare had evolved; once more.

The problem was that news media journalism had not evolved with the same rhythm of the available (communications) tools. Satellite communications demanded life and constant flow of information; and the audiences what an hourly update of what was going on in the battlefield. However, no even the military operations had such a high rhythm. After each combat, or skirmish, the fighting grounds normally enter a quiet phase, were there’s nothing to report about. Not on the military Situation Report (SITREP) neither on the news media report; but the demand for an update persists.

The absence of “Breaking News”, on an hourly basis, combined with the political agenda of the news media channels, were putting a tremendous pressure on the editors back home, and they made sure to transfer that pressure to the reporters on Bosnia’s grounds. The “war correspondents” had to feed their bosses with some “stuff” to broadcast or print; and that’s what they did … they looked for “stuff”; and fast, even if that distorted the information. Reporting first became more relevant than reporting better; and it would have to have a touch of dramatics (because that’s what the audiences wanted). The new mantra was:

–“If it beads, it leads”.

It was a mixture of information and (sadistic) entertainment – and that’s how INFOTAINMENT was borne.

The presence of war correspondents on the fighting grounds was just another characteristic of the battlefield reported on the daily briefings; like it was the meteorology, the battle order, or the daily flight schedule. There was nothing anyone could do about it; apart from being fit to operate, and carry-on under those conditions.

Bósnia 95 – “Turismo de Guerra”

Em Agosto de 1995, em plena guerra da Bósnia, assisti a algo que ainda não tinha visto – “Turismo de Guerra”. Tudo começou numa patrulha sobre o Monte Igman (acessos a Sarajevo) quando percorria um trilho que ainda não tinha frequentado. No carro da ONU seguiam também outros dois Observadores Militares (UNMO) e um intérprete. Segundo o intérprete, aquele era o caminho mais rápido para sair de Igman. O piso, em terra batida, era péssimo e estávamos a levantar mais pó que uma tempestade de areia. Nas bermas começaram a surgir trincheiras guarnecidas por soldados do Exército (muçulmano) da Bósnia Herzegovina – ABiH. Para minha admiração, junto às posições de trincheiras estavam algumas carrinhas de venda ambulante. Porém, o que me deixava desconcertado no cenário, era a presença de uma quantidade de civis a tirar fotos aos combatentes. Estupefacto, perguntei o que era aquilo, e alguém dentro do carro respondeu:

– “É uma excursão de “Turismo de Guerra”. A nova moda da Europa!”

– “Turismo de Guerra”?!? Isto parece o intervalo nas filmagens de um épico de Hollywood, onde os atores fazem uma pausa para uma cervejinha e um hotdog.” – Repliquei.

Tradução: ***“à vossa direita poderão ver uma posição defensiva do ABiH; na próxima paragens haverá uma demonstração de snipers Sérvios”.***

Eu estava chocado com os turistas de guerra, mas o nosso camarada Belga, um UNMO veterano dos Balcãs, explicou que aquele conceito era o renascer de algo antigo. De acordo com os seus pergaminhos da História terá sido na Batalha de Waterloo que apareceram os primeiros espectadores a assistir aos combates, de uma forma organizada. Isso fazia com que os Belgas fossem considerados os primeiros turistas de guerra europeus.

Entretanto, as máquinas fotográficas voltaram-se para nós e dois indivíduos, com sotaque holandês, aproximaram-se do carro perguntando como estava a situação em Sarajevo. Coincidentemente, o terceiro UNMO dentro do carro era exactamente Holandês e respondeu-lhes, direto em Flamengo, algo que não vou reportar mas que seria a versão vernácula de:

– “Hó meu … vai bugiar”.

Arrancámos sem estardalhaço e sem repreender os “turistas” para não provocar os soldados, que tinham as armas carregas e estavam a usufruir dos seus 15 minutos de fama. Quem sabe se, ao final daquele dia, alguns daqueles ABiH não terão sobrevivido para contar a história.

To Be seen or not To Be seen, that is the Question.

“Visibility” is the basic difference in the attitude of a tactical combatant and that of a peacekeeper. It may even be the same person, using the same hardware; but the behavior changes considerably. Acting with “visibility” is an important part of that change.

– “The combatant wants to see without being seen, while the peacekeeper wants to see and also to be seen.”

In UN operations, that is also applied. If it is a Peacekeeping operation (Article 6 of the UN Charter) the blue helmets will be tasked to verify peace agreements and separation lines, therefore they want to see and they want to be seen by the opposing factions, not only as a deterrence tactic but also as an assurance of UN support to their well-being.

In the other hand, if the UN mission is a Peace Enforcement operation (Article 7 of the UN Charter), then combat engagements are on the table and the blue helmets will act as combatants, wishing to see but not to be see; until, of course, the situation is solved, and they should pass to Peacekeeping mode.

Snow cleaners in Luanda – Inspiration for a cartoonist

October 1992 – In a C-130 flight, that took over 20 hours (with two technical stops of one hour in Cape Verde and Saint Tomé & Prince) we flown from Lisbon (Portugal) to Luanda (Angola). When the Hercules finally reached the vertical of Luanda, the pilot made a wide traffic pattern, which permitted us to have a good look of Angola’s Capital. The City Center was made of nice avenues, with beautiful colonial villas and tall buildings bordering the seaside. Beyond that it was a never-ending musseque; a confusing huddle of small houses made of clay and zinc sheets roofs. Over 70% of Luanda’s two million inhabitants lived there.

During landing, I noticed that Luanda’s International Airport was militarized, with lots of communication and radar antennas alongside with warfare paraphernalia distributed between the taxiways and the runway. However, the equipment that attracted my attention the most were three rusty vehicles, standing still beyond the aircraft apron tarmac. I felt I knew what those vehicles were; but I could not correlate the object with the situation. I was facing one of those surrealist scenes that moved against the stereotype. Something like a ship stranded in plain desert, which got me confused and very curious.

When we disembarked there was a small delegation of the United Nations and the Portuguese Embassy waiting for the group of ten Portuguese Air Force Officers, selected to run the United Nations air campaign for Angola’s first free elections.

I asked one of the Embassy military staff members what were those vehicles, rusting on the tall grass, which seemingly haven’t been used for a very long time.

– “Those are snow-cleaners from the Soviet aid to Angola”. – Someone answered.

–“So that’s what it is … but … snow-cleaners?! In Angola? – I asked, controlling myself not to laugh and offend someone.

–“Yes, of course” – Replied my interlocutor – “For the Soviet any International Airport worth of that category had to have snow-cleaner … the geographic latitude was a mere detail. They have sent a lot of equipment to help Angola. Apparently the snow-cleaners were on the Airport aid kit.”

Obviously those machines were never used (at least not for its original purposes) and were rotting on the same spot they were unloaded. These “out of context” machines became the surrealistic push I needed to start drawing cartoons, and writing mission logs, in every mission I made throughout my military carrier. Something that latter on was of particular use, because in Peace Support Operation one is not supposed to take pictures, in order not to be accused of intelligence gathering for the opposing faction. Those mission logs and cartoons (that I still keep) are the living memory of many, many, weird but interesting situations that I would like to share with you.

Os media na guerra da Bósnia – “If it bleeds it leads”.

No final do mês de novembro de1995, quando já se passeava pelas ruas de Sarajevo devido ao recente Acordo de Cessar Fogo, reparei numa placa de mármore, fixada num prédio de esquina ao final da Avenida Marechal Tito, que dizia:

– “A verdade foi a primeira vítima da guerra fratricida nos Balcãs”.

Tinha lá sido colocada, no ano anterior, por um pequeno grupo de intelectuais que conseguiram iludir os snipers. A origem desta frase é atribuída ao Senador Americano Hiram Johnson (1918), quando se referiu à Primeira Guerra Mundial e ao peso que a desinformação, a censura e a propaganda tiveram sobre os resultados das batalhas.

O paradigma aplicava-se na perfeição à Guerra da Bósnia. A verdade estava sufocada debaixo dos argumentos políticos de cada uma das fações. Os sérvios tinham perdido a Batalha da Informação, e isso fez toda a diferença nas Guerras da Ex-Jugoslávia. Nos tempos modernos, podiam-se ganhar todas as campanhas, e ainda assim perder a guerra, se não se soubesse contar a história; e depressa. Os Muçulmanos Bósnios entenderam isso e dominaram o assunto mediático, influenciando as decisões do campo de batalha. A forma de fazer a Guerra tinha evoluido (de novo).

O problema era que o jornalismo não tinha evoluído ao mesmo ritmo das suas próprias ferramentas. As comunicações via satélite exigiam notícias actualizadas a cada hora que passasse. Contudo, nem sequer as operações militares tinham um ritmo tão intenso. Após terminar um combate, normalmente entrava-se num período onde havia muito pouco ou nada a reportar; mas a exigência de mais notícias mantinha-se.

A ausência de “Breaking news” a toda a hora, conjugada com as agendas políticas de cada canal informativo, exercia uma tremenda pressão sobre as respectivas redações, as quais passavam a responsabilidade para os jornalistas no terreno. Para “calar” o chefe os repórteres buscavam qualquer coisa, muitas vezes provocando distorção na qualidade da informação. Noticiar primeiro passou a ter mais importância do que noticiar melhor. Não só isso, procuravam explorar todas e cada situação para publicar histórias que vendessem jornais e tempo de antena. Dizia-se mesmo entre os capacetes azuis

– “Se (a história) sangrar, lidera (as notícias)” – (If it bleeds it leads).

A presença de jornalistas passou a fazer parte dos briefings de caracterização do campo de batalha, tal qual faziam parte o posicionamento das forças beligerantes, a morfologia do terreno ou a meteorologia. A única coisa que os capacetes azuis podiam fazer era estarem preparados para operar naquelas condições.

História aeronáutica Portuguesa – Travessia do Atlântico Sul

Fez no dia 30 de Março, 98 anos do início da Travessia do Atlântico Sul por Gago Coutinho e Sacadura Cabral. Uma iniciativa no âmbito das celebrações do Centenário da Independência do Brasil, tendo essa data (30 de março) passado a ser considerada o dia do Aviador Português.

Embora o objectivo final tenha sido alcançado em apoteose, a heróica travessia do Atlântico sul não foi propriamente dita uma aventura plena de sucessos e boa fortuna. Pelo contrário, a longa distância de 8.383 quilómetros, percorridos em 62 horas e 26 minutos de voo, a uma velocidade média de 130 Km/H, foi feita em 11 etapas (início 30MAR1922; fim 17JUN1922) e utilizaram-se 3 hidroaviões “Fairey III-D” (o Lusitânia, o Pátria e o Santa Cruz). Durante esta travessia perderam-se dois hidroaviões (o Lusitânia e o Pátria) tendo a tripulação ficado naufraga no meio do Oceano Atlântico e, no segundo infortúnio, foram recuperados por um navio cargueiro Inglês quando as suas vidas já estavam em perigo. Pormenor curioso; o Comandante Gago Coutinho terá ficado tão agradecido ao Comandante do navio que manteve contacto com ele, tendo-lhe oferecido posteriormente uma cigarreira em ouro com a gravação do mapa do Atlântico e o ponto onde tinham sido resgatados marcado por um pequeno diamante – essa cigarreira esteve em 2012 exposta no Museu do Ar.

Chegada do Santa Cruz ao Rioi de Janeiro.

Outras travessias tinham sido efectuadas anteriormente; como a Travessia do Atlântico Norte por uma tripulação Americana. Porém, a Travessia Portuguesa teve dois aspectos únicos, que transformaram a aviação mundial – foi efectuada sem apoio de referências visuais externas, recorrendo somente à navegação aérea baseada na observação de astros. A Travessia dos Americanos tinha contado com o apoio de um navio de guerra posicionado a cada 100 quilómetros, que lhes ajudava a corrigir o rumo.

Sacadura Cabral era o piloto e Gago Coutinho o navegador. Para o efeito, Gago Coutinho desenvolveu um aparelho de navegação único, baseado num sextante e um horizonte artificial. Fazia leitura (em media) cada 20 minutos e conseguiu corrigir o rumo da aeronave na imensidão do Atlântico Sul, de modo a errar somente por escassos quilómetros, e não mais de 20 minutos, cada estima que fazia.

Taliban’s budget

Back in 2012, when I started a long mission at the United Nations’ mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), I couldn’t help wondering how much money had the Taliban to support all the activities they sponsored. Not only how much, but also where was it coming from. The reason for my questioning was because I learned the Taliban had a proper Government in exile (in Pakistan) with ministers, cabinets, “Provinces’ Taliban shadow Governors” ,etc.; they also sponsored a great number of religious schools (madrassas), where the recruited children had not to pay anything and were had all they needed (food, dressing, accommodation, education, etc.) for free; and then there was, off course, the payment of the jihadists’ salaries, running costs of all their (many)insurgent operations, buying weapons and ammunition, paying compensation money for the families of the suicide attackers, etc. etc.

In practical terms, it must require a lot of Money – millions – to run such an organization. Sure enough I found that the yearly Taliban budget (for that year) was well over 400 million USD. That was the answer for “how much” … now I had to find “where was it coming from”. The information was right there, floating in every “open source” report. The Taliban

There were seven incoming flows to the Taliban treasury: Donations from friendly Islamic countries; voluntary donations from rich private people in the diaspora; violent extortion or ransoms from businessmen (allowing them to maintain their business/families); illegal taxes from the population in the areas they dominated; corruption over the donations (for development projects) by the International Community; and, of course, drug trafficking.

The “Shadow Government” would keep 275 million USD for running expenses and the rest of the money was to be distributed throughout their warfighting activities. It was estimated the Taliban military operations would cost them between 100 and 155 million USD per year.

The extortion of large amounts of money was basically done over the mobile phone operators (or else their antennas would be destroyed); civil construction enterprises (allowing them to carry-on building roads and other large infrastructures; minerals exploration companies; distributors of electricity and water (in urban areas); and all sort of entities (national and international) dedicated to implement field development projects and humanitarian aid. Even the transportation companies (fuel trucks & cargo lorries) were on the list. The schemes had reach the ridiculous situation that the Taliban would be payed to let pass the fuel and ammunition transports for ISAF (across the Afghan/Pakistan border) to furnish the very same ISAF soldiers they would be fighting against, on the next morning. In fact, the Afghan/Pakistan border was one of the most important revenue sources not only for the Taliban, but for all sort of insurgency groups, criminality and corruption schemes. It was said that the amount of money made at the border control to the Afghan treasure was absolutely ridiculous compared with other entities were making. As long as the money would flow, the Jihad and the religious fundamentalism would fade out.

As far as the illegal taxation over the population on the areas dominated by the Taliban, there were two types of taxes: 10% over the crops and/or commercial profits; and 2,5% over the personal/private savings. People refusing to pay would be targeted for kidnaping and ransom.

The Drugs trafficking was one of the most important revenues for the Taliban. It was estimated they would make between 155 and 200 million USD per year with that activity. That alone was more than enough to sponsor their warfighting expenses. The Taliban would impose special taxation to opium farmers and chemistry labs (for heroine production), they would be payed to guard and escort drugs loads and transportation; etc. Afghanistan was well known to be the largest producer of opium in the world, generating 3,6 to 4 trillion USD a year. Taken those vast sums into consideration, if the Taliban were making “only” 200 million out of it … they were not abusing the system!

How is the war like in your country?

Bosnia 1995 – On the 18^th of August, it rained copiously the entire day and there was mud everywhere. With such inclement weather, one would expect the warring factions to slow down their activity; but it was exactly the opposite. One of the occurrences that marked the day was a sniper fire over one of the very few buses that were still running in Sarajevo. The bus was executing a very specific path, in a part of the City that was protected from the Serbian snipers’ view, transporting mainly (but not only) children to/from their school.

For me however, the experience that marked that day was a question asked by our neighbor youngest soon, which was boldly playing in the street and used to seek refuge in the UNMO house yard when things went wrong. Aware that I was a foreigner, the child asked his older brother to translate his curiosity:

– “How is the war like in your country?”

The child didn’t know any other environment beyond the ongoing conflict; therefore, for him, all other places should also have their own conflicts … especially if the people coming from those other places were dressing camouflage uniforms and wearing helmets.

There was only one game that kid could play on his street, which was “hide and seek”. He had to move fast, find the perfect hideout and not stay too long in the same place. He had never played football with his friends, on any other child’s play requiring a sniper’s fire carefree attitude.

Missão ONU na ex-Jugoslávia FORPRONU/UNPROFOR

No início dos anos 90 do Séc. XX, a ex-Jugoslávia implodiu num conflito fratricida. Uma guerra onde cerca de um quarto de milhão de pessoas morreram ou foram consideradas desaparecidas. Estimava-se que mais de um milhão de pessoas teriam perdido as suas casas, tendo a maioria das infra-estruturas do país ficado destruídas. No total, a guerra provocou cerca de dois milhões de refugiados.

Duas décadas após o início da Guerra na Bósnia, no dia 6 de abril de 2012, os 11 541 mortos da Cidade de Sarajevo foram recordados num impressionante evento. Colocaram-se 11 541 cadeiras vermelhas numa das ruas principais de Sarajevo e fez-se um concerto solene onde um coro cantou um tema intitulado – “Porque não estás aqui?”

Sarajevo, 6 de abril de 2012. Homenagem aos 11 541 mortos da Cidade – foto REUTERS/Dado Ruvic

Quando o conflito começou, a Organização das Nações Unidas respondeu prontamente, procurando minorar as consequências daquilo que foi considerado o maior conflito que a Europa assistiu, após a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Não estando preparada política e estruturalmente para resolver conflitos de tamanha envergadura, a ONU optou por colocar no terreno uma força de Manutenção de Paz, num Teatro de Operações que não tinha chegado a qualquer acordo para resolver o diferendo que alimentava a guerra.

Para muitos a UNPROFOR estava votada ao fracasso, uma vez que não iria conseguir cumprir com as espectativas das populações afetadas, nem com as exigências da Comunidade Internacional.

Para outros, a UNPROFOR foi crucial para o conflito Jugoslavo não se ter agudizado, ganhando tempo para uma resolução final e duradoura do problema.

Pessoalmente alinho com os que entendem ter sido a UNPROFOR crucial para que o conflito não se agudizasse. Mais ainda, entendo que a UNPROFOR lançou as bases para a evolução dos conceitos das Operações de Apoio à Paz da ONU; novos conceitos e posturas que viriam a salvar muita gente dos horrores da Guerra.

Covid 19 – Parem de ser politicamente correctos

Confesso-me indignado com as imagens que vejo na TV, onde verifico que as pessoas ainda não entenderam a gravidade da situação que se vive. Foi assim que na Idade Média a peste matou metade da Europa. Para mentes medievais devem de se tomar medidas medievais! De nada nos servem as “amplas liberdades” a um metro e meio debaixo do solo, alinhados em cantões. O Governo tem de dar “Regras de Empenhamento” mais firmes às forças de segurança.

Os nossos governantes ainda não entenderam que “o povo” gosta de ver alguém com pulso a liderar a “maralha”. Talvez assim entendam:

PAREM DE SER POLITICAMENTE CORRECTOS!

“Mais vale o PS dizer nas próximas eleições que estamos vivos por causa das medidas deles; que a oposição vir dizer que morreram muitos por causa dos frouxos no Governo”.