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The Media and the Military (M&M)

The news media’s job is to report the news. News can be defined as something that makes today different from yesterday. With that definition in mind, nearly every issue with which the military are involved is newsworthy; especially if the battle rhythm is slower than the news broadcast needs; which is normally the case.

The new security environment obliges political/military answers that rely on multi-national forces, coming from a myriad of different cultural and social realities. The principles of democracy dictate that governments maintain the support and confidence of their population. This necessitates a free, honest flow of information. This access to information often conflicts with the need of security in military operations. In the other hand, it fits perfectly in having the “sending Nations” living rooms during TV prime time and the political offices (back home) satisfied with the development of “our brave boys and girls at the front line”. Commanders and their staffs, at all levels, must consider these requirements in all types of operations; being in peacetime, in crisis or in open conflict.

**“can’t live with it, can’t live without it”**

Having the Command and Control of a multinational force also means the Concern and Constrain of a multinational media interest. The Force Commander must anticipate such interest, and consider it as a part of the operations’ planning process.

The operational management of multinational contingents requires structural changes to the customary single nation operation, which, in turn, will require a changed approach to traditional Public Information (PI) functions. While PI operations in a multinational force are decentralized, their success depends on unity of effort. All levels of command must work towards common goals following common guidance. If proper measures are put in place ahead of developments, the Military and the Media can operate in sync, but there should be no space for the temptation to interfere in each other’s work sphere.

“In a Military Operation, the Media and the Military are like a railway track; they work close to each other, in the same direction, BUT in a parallel way and independently. If one of the parts tries to change that, the entire Operation (the train) will derail”.

And just when we all thought we (M&M) had it right … up came the social media platforms; where both “M” reside inside the same person. Any soldier with a mobile phone can become a front line news correspondent, showing the guys back home how cool he/she looks in combat fatigue, or crying for mom’s help (live) when under fire in a Taliban ambush. Yet another issue for the Commander’s concern: Where and when to apply censorship procedures? Restrictions on broadcasting (jammers)? Prohibition of certain devises? Etc.

Regardless the solution, in today’s world Strategic Communications is a mandatory component of any military operation’s planning. Because, like the psychotherapist, psychoanalytic, sociologist, philosopher and author Paul Watzlawick (1950s) used to say:

“One cannot, not communicate.”

Mission stories (Angola) “they’ve stole the runway lamps”

A certain day, back in 1992, during my mission for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Luena – Angola – I was informed that the tanker aircraft due to replenish our aircraft fuel stock was going to fly to Luena only at night. Being the person in charge for the UN air activity in the wide region of Luena (Province of Moxico) I tried to coordinate the night flight with the airfield authorities. A very nice old man shake negatively his head, looked me in the eyes and, in a low tone, said:

– “I don’t know how to put this nicely … but … someone stole our runway lamps. We only have 14 lamps, and they are short-circuiting. We cannot operate at night!”

That was a new input, with a direct (very) negative impact on the distribution of the electoral material we were supposed to deliver for the upcoming Angolan Elections. I tried to negotiate with Luanda the arrival of the tanker aircraft during day-light, but it was impossible. Luena’s distance to Luanda, the high level of requests for more Jet A1 fuel and the shortage of tanker aircraft, was such, that we could only be resupplied at night.

– “But how can someone steal our runway lamps, in a City that doesn’t have electricity and we are practically the only guys having a generator?” – I asked irritated.

However, that was a rhetoric question, and I was supposed to “Improvise, Adapt and Overcome”, because, on the next morning, three heavy helicopters and one medium fixed wing aircraft were going to take-off to support the electoral process.

In a region devastated by decades of civil war, where all air navigation aids had been destroyed and the GPS was still a “new thing”, fuel replenishment night flights were indeed an adventure worth to be compared to the air pioneers. C13O Hercules aircraft from “TransAfrik” did those flights, with international crews that were veterans from many other wars around the world. They would come … all I had to do was to point them where the runway was.

– “We shall do it the old fashion way … lighting small fires alongside the runway on its edges. That should do it, because there’s no other light source on the ground in the vicinity.”

All we had to decide the set-up of the small fires, maintaining them in safe and secure conditions for aircraft operations. In one of Luena’s hangars there was a deposit of used artillery 122 mm shells … hundreds of them. Those large tubes were perfect for our needs; hence we decided to bury one each 50 meters alongside the runway, fill them with some leftover Jet A1 fuel, and introduce a wick made out of old uniforms we could find everywhere. On the tarmac of the runway threshold we would put big powder milk empty cans, following the same system. That was a very sweaty end afternoon for the five UNDP folks residing in Luena, but we managed to light-up the runway, just in time for the first C-130 to land.

The tactical fuel bladders were filled with Jet A1 and, on the following days, three heavy UN helicopters and a medium size fixed wing aircraft were refueled and took-off in order to support the Angolan electoral process, as nothing had happened. Mission accomplished.

Histórias de missão (Angola) Roubaram as luzes da pista

Certo dia de operação na missão do Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD), em 1992, na Cidade de Luena – Angola – fui informado que o avião reabastecedor de combustível para aeronaves da ONU passaria a reabastecer-nos somente à noite. Como era responsavel pela gestão da actividade aérea da ONU na Provincia do Moxico, e uma vez que estavamos com pouco de combustível de aeronaves (Jet A1) armazenado, tentei coordenar o voo noturno de reabastecimento com as autoridades do aeródromo de Luena. Um homem muito simpático abanou a cabeça, olhou-me nos olhos e disse em voz baixa:

– “Não sei como lhe vou dizer isto, …, mas…, …, roubaram-nos as luzes de pista a noite passada. Só deixaram ficar 14 candeeiros, que estão em curto-circuito. Não podemos operar à noite!”

Era um dado novo, com impacto direto na distribuição do material para as eleições angolanas que se aproximavam a passos largos. Tentei negociar a vinda no meio aéreo da ONU durante as horas de luz solar, mas foi em vão. O constrangimento do reabastecimento noturno era inultrapassável, devido ao aumento das necessidades de Jet A-1 e à escassez de meios aéreos de distribuição.

– “Mas como é que nos roubam as lâmpadas de pista numa cidade onde não há energia eléctrica, e praticamente só nós é que temos gerador?”

Mas a pergunta era retórica, porque o que era necessário era resolver o assunto.

Numa região onde a guerra tinha destruído todas as ajudas rádio à navegação aérea e o sistema GPS estava a dar os primeiros passos, os voos noturnos de reabastecimento de combustível eram uma aventura, digna dos pioneiros da aviação. As tripulações dos C-130 da TransAfrik que faziam esses voos eram constituídas por veteranos de outras guerras, com uma grande variedade de países de origem. Todos eles eram profundos conhecedores do território Angolano, porque voavam naquelas paragens durante a guerra civil. A solução era fazer a coisa à moda antiga.

– “Vamos fazer fogueiras ao logo da pista para os pilotos verem a faixa de aterragem. Não deve de ser difícil de identificar porque não há mais luzes nenhumas nos arredores“

Restava saber como é que iriamos fazer as fogueiras. Num dos hangares de Luena, estavam armazenadas centenas de invólucros de projéteis de artilharia de 122 mm. Decidiu-se enterrar na berma de terra um cartucho de 50 em 50 metros, e meter lá dentro o pouco combustível que nos restava, com torcidas de pano feitas de fardas abandonadas. No alcatrão de ambas as cabeceiras da pista colocaram-se latas de leite em pó seguindo o mesmo sistema. Desta forma conseguiu-se ter a pista sinalizada de uma forma controlada. Foi um final de tarde bastante suado para os cinco elementos do PNUD em Luena, mas conseguiu-se fazer o que se pretendia, a tempo e horas.

Naquela noite, os C130 da TransAfrik apareceram sobre Luena e, após umas passagens baixas para se certificarem do local, aterraram e abasteceram os nossos depósitos tácticos de combustível. Nos dias seguintes a ONU pode continuar a voar normalmente, sem que nada de extraordinário se tivesse passado.

They shall not be forgotten Eles não serão esquecidos

These are the 20 Portuguese military personnel that have paid, with their own blood, the ultimate price serving in Peace Support Operations. They shall not be forgotten!

Estes são os 20 militares Portugueses que pagaram, com o seu próprio sangue, o preço derradeiro ao serviço das Operações de Apoio à Paz. Eles não serão esquecidos!

1992

Private (OR1) – Fernando Silva Teixeira – Soldado

1995

Staff Sergeant (OR6) – Américo Oliveira Dias – Primeiro-sargento

1996

Private First Class (OR3) –Alcino Lázaro Mouta – Primeiro-cabo

Private First Class (OR3) – Francisco Ressureição Barradas – Primeiro-cabo

Specialist/Corporal (OR4) – Manuel Janeiro Gonçalves – Cabo-adjunto

Private (OR1) – Ricardo Borges Souto – Soldado

Private First Class (OR3) – Rui Reis Tavares – Primeiro-cabo

1998

Staff Sergeant (OR6) – António Pires Batista – Primeiro-sargento

Captain (OF2) – Álvaro Garcia Costa – Capitão

2000

Private (OR1) – José Gonçalves Lopes – Soldado

Staff Sergeant (OR6) – José Moreira Fernandes – Primeiro-sargento

2002

Private (OR1) – Diogo Dantas Ribeirinho – Soldado

Major-General (OF7) – Paulo Pereira Guerreiro – Major-general

2004

Private (OR1) – Ricardo Pombo Valério – Soldado

2005

Staff Sergeant (OR6) – João Roma Pereira – Primeiro-sargento

2007

Private (OR1) – Sérgio Oliveira Pedrosa – Soldado

2010

Private First Class (OR3) – José Madeira Bernardino – Cabo-adjunto

Sergeant First Class (OR7) – Hermenegildo Almeida Marques – Sargento-ajudante

2012

Second Lieutenant (OF1) – Daniel Varela Simões – Alferes

2017

Sergeant First Class (OR7) – Gil Paiva Benido – Primeiro-sargento

Their names are craved of the Fortress of Bom-Sucesso, in Lisbon, which is the house of the Combatant’s Museum of the Portuguese Veterans’ League.

Os seus nomes estão gravados na parede do Forte do Bom-Sucesso, em Lisboa, sede do Museu do Combatente, da Liga dos Combatentes Portuguesa.

“É mais fácil desintegrar um átomo do que um preconceito!”

O Afeganistão parece estar a começar a mudar. Mesmo dentro da liderança dos insurreccionistas, nota-se uma postura distinta de há uns anos atrás, buscando uma possível solução para um conflicto que se arrasta há décadas. Qualquer solução terá de levar cerca de 30 anos ver resultados, porque é o tempo necessário para uma nova geração nascer, aprender e crescer no novo sistema. Gradualmente as crianças irão passar à fase adulta e a tomar decisões sobre o destino das suas vidas e do seu país. Os jovens têm de ter a possibilidade de expressar os seus ideais, lealdades e oposições através do combate político.

Se não houver possibilidade de discussão de ideias, com oposição e divergência política, passa a haver resistência e conflitualidade armada.

Por debaixo de cada burca há uma moça que quer usar blue jeans e quer ir à escola

Se alguma coisa a comunidade internacional fez bem no Afeganistão, foi o investimento massivo nas escolas e na educação de rapazes e raparigas.

As sociedades não progridem com rituais, mas sim com inovação. Contudo, isso não é uma tarefa fácil porque, como dizia Albert Einstein:

“É mais fácil desintegrar um átomo do que um preconceito!”

UN field operations’ attire in Afghanistan

Back in UNAMA – Afghanistan – pending on the job to be done and the audience waiting to hear you, the military advisers would wear uniform or dress civilian cloths. In the latter case, the old saying “When in Rome do like the Romans” would be applicable .. with the necessary adaptations.

UN Military Advisers (MILAD) and UN Military Observers (UNMO), by definition, do not carry weapons. The rational is that an unarmed officer does not pose a threat to anyone, and they are more likely to be accepted by the warring factions in order to engage in negotiation meetings.

Should the meeting be with Afghan Armed Forces, or NATO representatives, the MILAD would present himself wearing his/hers battlefield uniform; if the meeting would be with local ancients and religious authorities, a local civilian attire could be more appropriate. Not only the international military staff would look less aggressive; it was also the locals liked to see (a the Western officer respecting their traditions and way of living) and it had a security aspect in it. In regions where the insurgency was particularly active, the presence of unarmed foreigners in military uniform could attract unwanted attention to the rest of UN staff, jeopardizing the safety and security of the UN civilian personnel travelling with the Military Advisers, and the success of the mission .

It was not a perfect solution, but then again … “perfection is a Divine task, we only sought excellency“.

UN Azul versus UN Negra

Poucos se terão dado conta que, nas missões no terreno, existem duas ONUs: A ONU Azul e a ONU Negra. Pelo menos é assim que pensam muitos dos autóctones, nos vários territórios onde a Organização mantém uma presença por esse Mundo fora.

A razão dessa diferenciação junto das populações está na caracterização das viaturas da instituição, em que umas têm as letras UN escritas a azul claro e outras têm-no em preto.

Esta imagem possuí um atributo alt vazio; O nome do arquivo é un-azul-e-negra.jpg

Mas a opção cromática não é aleatória; ela efectivamente identifica diferentes entidades dentro da “família UN”. Assim, os veículos ao serviço das agências e programas da ONU que prestam apoio direto às populações; tipo: – o Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD – UNDP); o Fundo das Nações Unidas para a Infância (UNICEF); ou o Alto Comissariado das Nações Unidas para os refugiados (UNHCR) – todos têm as inscrições “UN” impressas em azul claro. Por outro lado, os veículos das missões da ONU implementadas pelo Conselho de Segurança; como por exemplo: – a UNAMA (Afeganistão); a MINUSCA (Rep. Centro Africana); ou a MINUSMA (Mali) – têm essas letras impressas a negro.

O problema é que a população apercebe-se disso e reage em conformidade. Os carros da “UN Azul” são sinónimo de ajuda e, portanto, são bem recebidos; enquanto os carros da “UN Negra”, dependendo da situação, são sinónimo de inspeção, ou interferência (militar) estrangeira, e nem sempre são bem recebidos – especialmente em zonas de insurgência ou dominadas por “senhores da guerra”.

Independentemente da coloração dos seus carros, a presença da ONU ou é desejada ou é repudiada, …, mas nunca é indiferente. No Afeganistão os militares capacetes azuis andam fardados e desarmados no meio da população, e ainda só tiveram uma baixa … a NATO (ISAF/RS) tem uma outra realidade e outros números de baixas a lamentar.

Mission Stories – Boutrus Ghali imposes respect on UN (Bosnia 1995)

One day, back in UNPROFOR 1995, we’ve learned about an awkward, but funny, story coming from another UN Military Observers’ team, stationed down in the southern part of the Krajina – Croatia. Allegedly, that town’s local police had received a formal complaint against “Boutrus Ghali” – the UN Secretary-General. According to the complainer:

– “Boutros Ghali is not to be trusted, because “he” has the tendency to bite people on their way into the UN building.”

After an initial stupefaction, the scene became clear. That town had a UNMO team which lived on a rented house. There was a fence around the house and the team had adopted a dog and, affectionately, named it “Butruos Gali”; being careful not to write the dog’s name in the same way of the UN’s Secretary-General (but the pronunciation was the same). Butros was a nice little mascot, always playing in the front yard of the UNMO Team House, where the UN flag was flying on a pole. In time, the little dog became a large Mastiff, with protective instincts regarding the UNMO officers and their House. No stranger should enter into the UN fence without prior announcement at the gate, in order for the dog to be kept away. It was a simple procedure, which had been working for a long time with no problems. There was even a sign at the gate saying (in Serbo-Croatian and in English):

– “Caution with the dog, announce yourself!”

One day, a gentleman (the complainer) with “less clarified” intentions, decided to enter the UNMO house, during the night, without ringing the main gate’s bell, or yelling to announce his presence. Half way into the front yard, the gatecrasher had and “encounter of the third degree” with Butros Gali. Realizing he had committed a big mistake, the trespasser rune back to the gate, not without being bitten on his “gluteus maximums” before reaching the door.

The ridiculousness of that situation was that, while reporting the occurrence to the police, the “complainer” never referred he had been bitten by a watchdog, but instead referred to the animal by its name – Butros Gali. The complainer ended his denouncement with an inconsequent demand, which, out of the context, was even more hilarious:

– “Boutros Ghali should be firmly tied with a chain to a Security post.”

Off course nothing happen and the police officers ended up interrogating that gentleman about what was he doing at night, entering the UN house without announcing himself?

As for that UNMO team, they decided to substitute the sign at the gate. The new one simply said:

– “CAUTION – Don’t fuck around with Butros Gali!

The other Boutros Ghali, the real one, was actually a very nice and sympathetic person, known by everyone as “Uncle Broutos”, incapable of biting anybody. Nevertheless, in Belgrade, this episode raised the moral of all UNMO officers; because, for once the UN imposed some respect in the mission area.

It was a pity that it was done by the wrong Boutrus Ghali.

Portuguese Air Force Memorial in Siauliai

Throughout the History, the Portuguese have always left their mark wherever they’ve traveled all over the World. It’s a cultural thing … we can’t help it. Having said that, it should have come with no surprise, back in 2007, when the Portuguese Air Force contingent in Siauliai – Lithuania – decided to leave a mark of their presence 3000 kilometers away from their home, during their Baltic Air Police mission.

Like every other international contingent, the Portuguese left several souvenirs inside the Airbase; but that was not enough. It needed to be something they would share with the local population; something the Lithuanian Air Force and the Portuguese Air Force had in common … both insignias were crosses. The Portuguese detachment would offer a Cross – their Cross – to Siauliai, and what better place to do it if not the “Hill of Crosses” of Siauliai.

The nice surprise was that, when the Portuguese personnel asked permission to the Lithuanian authorities to place their cross in the Hill of Crosses, the answer was:

– “Yes but, …, will wish to make it officially and we will send the Lithuanian Armed Forces highest religious authority – the Bishop – to bless your Templar Cross”.

Lithuanian Armed Forces Bishop blessing the Portuguese Air Force Cross

A proper military ceremony, simple but full of meaning and dignity, was organized, and it did not have a fly-by with Portuguese F-16 because the weather conditions did not permit it.

The “Hill of Crosses” is a peregrination site, located about 15 kilometers from down town Siauliai. Nowadays it is a touristic place, but it all started as a “resistance” expression against the Russian expansionist attitude. Later, during the Soviet domination of the Baltic States, Siauliai population restarted to place crosses in that deserted place, contradicting the Soviet anti-religion posture, in memorial of the Lithuanians that were deported to Siberia by the Soviet authorities. During the day the authorities would remove the crosses, but during the night the population would put new ones and its number increased considerably throughout the times.

the manufacturers at the main gate of AT-1 – Lisbon

The Portuguese Air Force Cross was prepared by military and civilian staff on volunteer work, and it is made of metal and painted with the very same ink used on the aircraft. It was constructed in the military part of Lisbon Airport – AT-1 – and flown to Siauliai on board of the C-130 that carried the combat logistic support for the 4 Portuguese F-16 deployed in that Airbase.

Operação Althea da União Europeia (EUFOR)

No dia 2 de Dezembro de 2004, após negociações em Berlim, a Aliança Atlântica reduziu a sua presença na Bósnia para um contingente mínimo de um Quartel-General dedicado a tarefas de modernização das Forças Armadas da Bósnia Herzegovina, e a União Europeia passou a tomarconta das operações militares através da EUFOR. A operação EUFOR, cujo efectivo multinacional tinha cerca de 7.500 militares, denominou-se ALTHEA, numa alusão à Deusa mitológica que curava as feridas de guerra dos guerreiros Gregos. A missão da EUFOR consistia em passar gradualmente todas as responsabilidades de um Estado soberano da Comunidade Internacional de novo para o Governo da Bósnia Herzegovina, e dar o apoio necessário à Comunidade Internacional que se encontra a operar no Teatro de Operações. Com o tempo, a EUFOR reduziu gradualmente o seu efectivo, mantendo até finais da década de 2010 uma presença de militares e GNRs Portugueses no terreno.

O grosso das forças da Althea estava estacionado no famoso “Camp Butmir”, em Sarajevo, o qual ao longo dos tempos teve uma utilização militar bastante intensa, com particular incidência na Guerra da Bósnia por parte das forças Sérvias.

Durante o primeiro semestre de 2008, cumprindo criteriosamente o calendário estabelecido por Bruxelas, a EUFOR transferiu para as Forças Armadas da Bósnia Herzegovina (BiH) grande parte das funções das funções militares que lhe tinham sido confiadas pela Comunidade Internacional, das quais se realçam a Transferência do Controlo de Movimento de Armas e Material Militar dentro da Bósnia e Herzegovina, a Transferência de Autoridade da Guarda e Supervisão dos Paióis Militares na Bósnia e Herzegovina, a Transferência de Autoridade das Inspecções de Armas e Explosivos na Bósnia e Herzegovina e a Transferência de Autoridade da Gestão do Espectro Electromagnético nas Bandas Militares. Desta forma, a EUFOR aproximou-se do seu próprio “END STATMENT”, restando-lhe pouco mais do que a sua vertente “European Gendarmerie – International Police Unit (IPU)”, onde operava um plotão de militares da GNR.

Desta forma, o conflito da ex-Jugoslávia, e a sua posterior resolução, contou com a presença de militares Portugueses, durante cerca de 20 anos, tendo servido sob as bandeiras das Nações Unidas, da (antiga CEE) Comunidade Europeia, da Aliança Atlântica e, posteriormente, União da União Europeia.