Military personnel deployed in the Theater of Operations should take into account the differences between Group Work and Team Work. Both cases of cooperative work are necessary but they are different and should be applied in different contexts. The differentiating factor is the TASK.
In the first case (Group Work) everybody has approximately the same task, moving in unison to reach the Crew’s common goal.
In the latter case (Team Work) each one has a different task to accomplish, and only with the accomplishment of all different tasks can the Crew achieve its common goal.
Pending on the situation, the same people can do the different works. Group Work is used in massive “all together” action/effort; whilst while Team Work is used in problem solving of technical aspects and decision making assessments.
It is for the leadership to decide which line of work should be followed, and assign the necessary resources.
Durante as Primeiras Eleições Livres Angolanas, que decorreram nos dias 29 e 30 de Setembro de 1992, os Angolanos votaram em massa, ultrapassando as previsões mais optimistas, com 92% dos eleitores inscritos (4 milhões e 400 mil pessoas) a exercerem pela primeira vez o dever/direito de voto. O número surpreendeu, já que se admitia uma taxa de abstenção na casa dos 20% a 30%. Os angolanos escolhiam entre 19 partidos, quem os iria governar.
No dia 01 de Outubro, depois do ato eleitoral, era a loucura total nos vários aeródromos espalhados pelo País, onde 10 oficiais da Força Aérea Portuguesa ao serviço da ONU, procuravam coordenar a operação aérea de suporte eleitoral. Todas aquelas urnas de voto tinham de ser rapidamente retiradas dos milhares de locais onde haviam sido colocadas por helicóptero, e reenviadas de imediato para Luanda em C-130. O que havia levado semanas a montar, teria de levar agora horas a desmontar.
Conforme os cargueiros aéreos iam levando as urnas de voto para Luanda, os votos no seu interior eram contados. Os resultados eleitorais, segundo os acordos de Bicesse, só deveriam ser formalmente anunciados no dia 08 de Outubro. Contudo, a comunicação social soube das contagens parciais e divulgou-as.
No dia 3 de Outubro, Jonas Savimbi (então líder da UNITA) dirigiu uma «Mensagem à Nação», na qual expressava que não aceitava os resultados das eleições, por ter havido fraude.
A violência estalou nas ruas da Capital e o conflito reacendeu-se por todo o País. A organização para ONU encarregada pelo apoio às eleições – Programa da ONU para o Desenvolvimento (PNUD/UNDP) – decidiu ativar o plano de evacuação que tinha elaborado e chamar para Luanda os 10 oficiais da FAP que estavam colocados noutras tantas Províncias Angolanos.
Após a chegada de todos os oficiais da FAP a Luanda, os responsáveis do PNUD fizeram uma avaliação da situação de segurança. Aparentemente as Forças Governamentais continuavam a ter o controlo da situação em Luanda, mas o clima de Guerra Civil tinha definitivamente regressado a Angola, e, no dia 8 de Outubro, o PND decidiu ativar o plano de “Evacuação Internacional”.
Os 10 militares portugueses foram chamados ao Quartel-General do PUND em Luanda e receberam as instruções desse “Plano”. Para admiração do grupo, o tal “Plano” consistia em entregar a cada um o dinheiro (cash) do preço de uma passagem aérea para Lisboa; um aperto de mão com um agradecimento (escrito) pelo trabalho bem efectuado; e um “Adeus até à próxima”!
Nesse mesmo dia, andava perdido pelas ruas de Luanda um grupo de 10 portugueses, com 20.000 dólares numa carteira, à procura de uma agência de viagens que “ainda” tivesse 10 lugares num avião para fora de Angola, de preferência com uma ligação para Lisboa. Não era bem este tipo de “PLANO DE EVACUAÇÃO” que os oficiais Portugueses estavam à espera.
Obviamente que não foi tarefa fácil, porque todos os voos estavam esgotados. Quando já começavam a ficar desesperados, lá conseguiram um voo num voo para esse mesmo final de tarde, num Boeing 747 francês, em direcção a Paris.
Cerca de 20 minutos após a descolagem da capital de Angola, o comandante de bordo transmitiu no sistema de som da aeronave a seguinte mensagem:
– Caríssimos passageiros, informo que o Aeroporto de Luanda acaba de ser encerrado a todo o tráfego aéreo até futuras instruções. Aparentemente fomos um dos últimos aviões comerciais a sair de Angola”.
Tinha recomeçado a guerra civil em Angola, a qual só viria a finalizar em 22/02/2002 com a morte de Jonas Savimbi, numa região próxima de Luena, em Lucusse.
In a UN mission, when one person less expects, he/she will/may have to stay away from the main Unit, sometimes for several days. In a conflict zone, the peacekeeper should not only plan to have his/her gear prepared for an unexpected stay, but also for an unexpected evacuation of the UN compound.
That brings about the issue of “Runaway Bags”; something to have permanently ready and close-by both at the accommodation’s doorstep, and in a trip.
Runaway Bags are no more than a collection of stuff someone may need in an emergency situation. Its “packing-up” is an individual responsibility and it should be prepared as soon as possible after arriving to the mission area. Everything should fit inside a backpack, and kept close to the door of the individual accommodation, in case there is an attack and that person has to “runaway”; or to take along in a routine trip/patrol (because we always know how they start … but we never know how they end).
Do not go on patrol without your “Runaway Bag”. You know how it starts but you don’t know how it ends!
The content varies with each person and with each mission area. Obviously a “runaway bag” made for the desert will not have the same content of that one made for the snowy mountain. However, overall, it should not weigh more than 15 kilos and should contemplate four areas of concern: First Aid; Survival; Food and Hygiene. The difficult part is to select how much of each article should go inside, in order to keep the backpack under the 15 kilos.
The First Aid section should consider having: the medicines/prescriptions that specific person is eventually taking; bandages and compresses; duct tape; a strangler garrotte; condom (it has multiple uses); anti exposure cream (sun and cold); band-aids; pharmacy disinfectant; water purification pills; insect repellent.
The Survival component should consider having: both local and hard currency money (because there are no free runaways); documents and photocopy of the documents; multifunction knife; flashlight; lighter and/or matches (fire); compass; small radio transistor (to hear the news); spare batteries for all the equipment taken; small mirror; glow sticks; notebook with pen/pencil; toilet paper (half roll compressed); whistle; sleeping bag; rope (10m); hat; rain cover; Walkie-Talkie (with mission frequency); one change of underwear..
The food section should have one litre of water (canteen); a combat ration; energy bars.
The personal hygiene should consider including: a small soap bar; dental cleaning material; some wet cleaning wipes.
During my missions, in several occasions I’ve regretted not paying enough attention to this matter but, believe me, it’s worth investing sometime right at the start, and then it’s done for most of the mission’s duration.
As prescribed on their “job description”, United Nations’ Military Observers have to negotiate compromised solutions between the warring factions. Those negotiations are normally conducted in meetings, with people that barely know each other; or even hate one another. Making arrangements with only one of the belligerents tend to be easier, but not necessarily more relaxed.
Back in 1995, during the Bosnian conflict, I recall a meeting with Serbs at Lukavica Barracs, which became a very educative Lesson Learned for further missions.
As the local protocol dictated, before talking business one had to discuss fait-divers. The Serbs tried to speak in English, as a gesture of politeness. The presence of a Portuguese officer was not very common and a good theme to start chatting. Portugal was a friendly country for the Serbs, because it was a small western European Christian country, without any particular interest in Bosnia. Furthermore, the Serbs in general were sport lovers and the name of the Portuguese football player – Luis Figo – jumped immediately to the table. There was also a number of Serbian football players that were, or had been, playing in Portuguese Teams at the time, but Alex didn’t have enough knowledge of football to support that conversation. Alex felt very embarrassed of his lack of football knowledge and took note of another lesson regarding negotiations with warring factions:
Lesson Learned – “Study the sportive history of the Host Nation and its relations with your own Nation. It is not enough to know the Host Nation’s history and culture heritage, because no one will be discussing that at the negotiation table. Knowing the Host Nation’s preferred sport, its athletes and the correspondence with the Troop Contributing Country is essential to break the ice and start a profitable negotiation.”
Back in 1995, Sarajevo had no electricity, no gas and no water distribution system operational. Living among the population, the UN Military Observers (UNMO) had to suffer the same restrictions and solve the same problems of the locals.
Going out for water replenishment was particularly interesting. The water collection point was located inside of a system of road tunnels, close to the sportive complex of Zetra where the Danish Army had a blue helmet’s Company, and not far from BiH HQ where the UNMO team had its front office. Zetra sportive complex was constituted by a large multipurpose pavilion and a football stadium. The pavilion was built to host the 1994 Olympic Winter Sports. Its metallic cover was pierced all around with bullet holes, and its structure showed a multitude of twisted iron bars. Inside the pavilion the blue helmets had installed tents and containers to support all sort of activities. Although very much alive with peacekeepers moving around, the infrastructure was a ruin altogether.
Sarajevo had two parallel road tunnels in Zetra vicinities. Those tunnels were almost 100 meters long crossing through an urban elevation covered with all sorts of modern dwellings. There was no vehicle traffic across the twin tunnels, which had been closed since the early stages of the war. However, the tunnels were of strategic importance because they offered anti-sniper shelter to people gathering in public places, such as collecting water from UN’s water tank trucks.
Compared with the absence of electricity, or gas, the lack of water was of the upmost importance to Sarajevo’s population, and the UN was trying to help. Between 1994 and 1996, the UN agencies and programs had made about 200 water wells inside Sarajevo. However, public gatherings were a major security issue and people couldn’t use the wells. Therefore, the UN implemented a distribution system with water tanks, which would collect the water at the wells and go to protected places – such as Zetra’s tunnels – for public distribution.
Those two tunnels also protected the locals from bad weather and they provided protection to setup small street markets inside. In truth, only one of the tunnels was fully dedicated for public use, because the other one, just a few meters away, only had a small portion dedicated to the population; the rest of the infrastructure was a shelter for ABiH warfare equipment. Locals used to say that the ABiH had four tanks in Sarajevo, and two of them were inside that tunnel. Regularly, the Bosnian soldiers would move one of the tanks to the opposite exit of the tunnel, facing the Serbian part of town, and fire its big weapon. After two or three rounds the tank would move back into the tunnel, remaining protected from Serbian retaliation fire.
When discussing the matter of Core Values and Competencies with other former UN staff, I have been noticing that there some confusion between Values and Competencies.
A Value is something everybody in the same organization shares, a common belief that guides de different actions and attitudes of all its members, regardless their individual technical skills, in consonance with the United Nations Charter. It is something abstracted and not a product that be measured; but the Peacekeeper can be accountable for.
The UN Core Values are: – “integrity”, “respect for diversity/gender” and “professionalism”. The question is: – What does that mean? How do you define it?
In acting with Integrity, the Peacekeeper: – upholds the principles of the United Nations Charter; demonstrates the managerial principles of the United Nations, including impartiality, fairness, honesty and truthfulness, in daily activities and behavior; acts without consideration of personal gain; resists undue political pressure in decision-making; does not abuse power or authority; stands by decisions that are in the Organization’s interest even if they are unpopular; and takes prompt action in cases of unprofessional or unethical behavior.
Behaving with Professionalism, the Peacekeeper will: Show pride in work and in achievements; demonstrate skillful competence and mastery of subject matter; have a conscientious and efficient attitude in meeting commitments, observing deadlines and achieving results; be motivated by professional rather than personal concerns; show persistency when faced with difficult problems or challenges; and will remain calm in stressful situations.
Respect for Diversity and Gender is reflected in: – Working effectively with people from all backgrounds; treating all people with dignity and respect; treating men and women equally; showing respect for, and understanding of, diverse points of view and demonstrating this understanding in daily work and decision-making; examining own biases and behaviors to avoid stereotypical responses; not discriminating against any individual or group.
What are UN Competencies?
The term “Competency” refers to a combination of skills, attributes and behaviors that are directly related to successful accomplishments of each and every UN staff member´s Job Description.
There two major types of Competencies: Core Competencies and Managerial Competencies.
The Core competencies (applicable to everybody) are: Communication; Teamwork; Planning & Organizing; Accountability; Client Orientation; Creativity; Technological Awareness; and Commitment to Continuous Learning.
The Managerial Competencies (for leaders) are: Vision; Leadership; Empowering Others; Managing Performance; Building Trust; and Judgement / Decision Making.
Let’s focus on the Core Competencies – applicable to all peacekeepers – and the way they should and shouldn’t behave, in order to assure a good image for themselves, their own countries and the United Nations Organization.
Core Competencies are not specific to any occupation, but rather to the overall staff. Specific technical or functional Skills are not included, because this Communication Plan concerns to the image of the Centre and not the individual Peacekeeper.
The matrix bellow portrays what is normally evaluated when accessing the Peacekeeper’s Competencies. Basically, it’s the DO(s) and DON´T(s) each blue helmet should consider.
Communication
Positive indicators
Negative indicators
Speak and write clear and effectively
Lack of confidence when talking
Listen to others, interpret messages from others and respond appropriately
Produce writing that is vague or wordy
Ask questions to clarify, show interest in having two-way communication
Use of inappropriate language
Tailor language, tone, style and format to match the audience
Lack of expression during an interview
Openness in sharing information (within OPSEC) and keeping the audience informed
Lost the attention of the audience at times
Drift from one subject to another
Limited positive feedback from others on communication effectiveness
Withholds information without justification
Teamwork
Positive indicators
Negative indicators
Work collaboratively with colleagues to achieve the goal
Rarely offers support to colleagues
Request inputs and genuinely value others´ ideas and expertise, willing to learn from others
Prefers to work and act alone
Place the Team agenda before personal agenda
Emphasizes achieving personal goals
Build consensus within the Team
Is prepared to ignore/disrupt majority decisions
Support and act in accordance with Team decisions, even when such decisions may not reflect own position
Shows limited consideration of the ideas and inputs from others
Share credit for Team accomplishments and accepts joint responsibility for team shortcomings
Takes the credit for Team accomplishments; passes on responsibility for Team limitations
Planning and Organizing
Positive indicators
Negative indicators
Develop clear goals consistent with agreed strategies
No clear system of priorities
Identify priority activities and assign/adjust priorities as required
Disorganized and unsystematic (impractical work schedules)
Allocate appropriate amount of time and resources for completing work
Unrealistic about timelines, deadlines not met, tasks not complete
Foresee risks and allow for contingencies when planning
Efforts get sidetracked
Monitor and adjust plans and actions as necessary
No checks on activities
Use time efficiently
Unwilling to change plans to meet new demands
Accountability
Positive indicators
Negative indicators
Takes ownership for all responsibilities and honors commitments
Defers responsibility
Delivers outputs for which one has responsibility within prescribed time, cost and quality standards
Does not deliver on commitments, compromises standards easily, cuts corners
Operates in compliance with organizational regulations and rules
Produces poor quality work and/or takes longer than is efficient to achieve quality
Supports subordinates, provides oversight and takes responsibility for delegated assignments
Unaware of standards that need to be achieved
Takes personal responsibility for his/her own shortcomings and those of the work unit, where applicable
Unconcerned with the standards of other people’s work once it has been delegated
“Client” Orientation
Positive indicators
Negative indicators
Consider all those to whom services are provided to be “clients” and, although maintaining and independent and impartial posture, seek to see things from the clients´ point of view
Limited awareness of clients´ point of view
Establish and maintain productive partnerships with clients by gaining their trust and respect
Only moderately concerned about helping others
Keep the clients informed of progress or setbacks in projects
Takes time to warm to people and establish relationships
Meet time for delivery of the projects to the clients
Does not work as hard as colleagues to meet client needs
——————————-
Little evidence of receiving client feedback
——————————
Laz in keeping clients informed
Creativity
Positive indicators
Negative indicators
Actively seek to improve programs or services
Slow to produce new ideas
Offer new and different options to solve problems or meet client needs
View problems in a conventional manner and thinks in a traditional way
Promote and persuade others to consider new ideas
Accepts the status quo
Take calculate risks on new and unusual ideas; think “outside the box”
Problem-solving lacks creativity
Take interest in new ideas and new ways of doing things
Produces few alternatives
Not bound by current thinking or traditional approaches
Little experience of creativity at work
Technological Awareness
Positive indicators
Negative indicators
Keep abreast of available technology
Limited knowledge about technologies
Understand applicability and limitations of technology to the work
Little interest in finding out about technologies
Actively seek to apply technology to appropriate tasks
Lack of proactivity in applying technology to work
Show willingness to learn new technologies
Limited understanding of the applicability of technology to work
Commitment to Continuous Learning
Positive indicators
Negative indicators
Keep abreast of new developments in NATO operations, exercises and experiments
Limited knowledge about NATO matters beyond the assigned projects
Actively seek to develop oneself professionally and personally
Patch of Military Advisory Unit – UNAMA Afghanistan
Late last winter, the Taliban have made an agreement with the USA to halt the violence in Afghanistan and start exchanging prisoners of war with the Afghan Government. Allegedly, the Taliban got from the US delegation the promise that the Afghan Government would release about 5.000 Taliban prisoners, but apparently that did not happened … at least not on the scale and time line the Taliban expected.
Meanwhile, time went by and spring has arrived, and the situation was not solved. We do not need a “Chrystal Ball”, to assess what’s next:
Question: What does normally occurs in Afghanistan in spring time?
Answer – Two things happen (very much correlated): It is Sowing time for OpiumPoppies; and the Taliban fighting campaign starts.
Not being able to comply with the promised development with the Taliban, together with the seasonal traditions in Afghanistan can only have an outcome – According to Al Jazeera news channel – the Taliban in the past few weeks have made over 70 attacks per day to the Afghan Government facilities.
The numbers of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) in this conflict are the dramatic aspect of it. 2020 starts with 1.293 CIVCAS, of which 533 died (including 152 children) and 760 were wounded.
One of my last patrols in UNPROFOR – Bosnia – 1995, while the belligerent factions were negotiating an enduring Peace Agreement in Dayton, was to go look for a U.S. journalist, which was allegedly missing behind the Serb’s lines. That news reporter wanted to write the Bosnia war story in a different angle – the Serbian perspective; he had requested the proper clearances to the Serb authorities but, for his great disappointment, never got any reply. However, silence was not an option for this courageous (but not so clever) journalists and he decided to go on his own. Shortly after his departure, he was reported missing.
In those times, practically all international journalists residing in Sarajevo were in close contact with each other, sharing information and contacts. They called themselves “The Tribe” and most of them lived the hotel Holiday Inn; or what was left of it. It was a modern building, noticeable by its yellow color, isolated from other builds right in the middle of the Snipers Alley. In 1995 the dwelling was in a very poor condition, due to sniper fire and artillery shelling. The side of the building face the Serb territory had practically no glass windows, in some accommodations there was UNHRC plastic bands substituting the widows. Here and there one could see multiple impacts of different caliber ordinance, with vestiges of fire inside the apartments.
The hotel guests had their rooms on the opposite side, facing the muslin part of Sarajevo. The seller of the hotel was the working space and the recreation area of the “Tribe.
The “Tribe´s” compound –Holiday Inn – Sarajevo. Photo offered by Jin Sullivan
Because they were living close together, all the journalists had a rough idea of what each other was working on. That was how our missing “hero” story came to live. His “Tribal fellows” knowing his ambitious intentions, reported his two days absence without news to the US Embassy in Sarajevo. The Embassy contacted the UN for support and the Regional Senior Military Observer did not take long to make a decision, issuing the following instructions:
– “Our Russian Major and the Portuguese Captain should leave immediately and search for this chucklehead. No not assign any other tasks to these two, because they may be away for some time.”
My Russian comrade – Alexey (fictitious name) – made the necessary contacts and off we went to Lukavica Barracks, in order to meet the Serbian officer responsible for operations around Sarajevo, but no one knew anything about an American journalist. However, we had to look for him and, together with the Serbian officer, we planned a patrol and got the necessary permissions to go to Pale, Srebrenica and Gorazde. The places we thought might have some interesting stories to tell in a different angle. We were not planning to sleep in Serbian territory. The plan was to return to Sarajevo every evening; hence this would be a three days mission.
We left Lukavica towards Pale. Our vehicle radio coverage was very poor so we kept transmitting blind position reports. Last thing we wanted was also to be considered missing. Our first stop was UNPROFOR UNMO Team 7-L – Pale. There were no UNMOs in that Team for some time, only a small group of interpreters that we were paying to keep the liaison with the Serbian leadership. Our interpreters made several contacts and confirm that there was a travel permission request. The Serbs though that was a CIA attempt to peek inside their lines and decided to refuse the request. However, in order not to have problems with the Americans, their option was not to answer the request. Regarding further initiatives of that journalist they knew nothing.
We asked around among the Serbian population and no one had saw the journalist. A Serbian officer said:
– “Yeap. I saw an American passing-by today,” – and spiting on the ground concluded – “but he was going very fast … inside an F-16!”
We travelled 70 km towards Southwest e we reach Gorazde. There were no more mines on the access road to the City. That was an evolution regarding the last week, resulting from the recent Cease Fire Agreement. We´ve asked for the journalism to both Serbs and Bosnians, but again, no one had seen any American around that place. We´ve returned to Sarajevo empty handed.
The following day we travelled early in the morning to Srebrenica, which was about 20 km from the Yugoslav border. It was a long trip and the destination was still a complicated area. That was a patrol to be handled with extreme caution. On the previous day my Russian comrade had made all the translations, but now we needed the help of one of our Team´s interpreters – Milan (fictitious name).
On the higher mountains of Bosnia there was already some snow, demanding precautionary measures regarding the driving of the armored Toyota. Milan asked over and over again to everybody if they had seen an American journalist. But the answer was always negative.
A Serbian patrol was also looking for him, result of our queries on the previous day, but that was not good news because the Serbs had a different story. They were looking for a CIA agent disguised as a journalist, and they wanted to teach him a lesson.
Upon arriving to Srebrenica we drove to the infamous factory facilities that hosted the recent months´ developments. The walls had still the bullet impacts allegedly from a Serbian firing squad during the cleansing actions. We asked and, yet again, no one had seen, or heard about an American journalist. We didn’t stay long because the situation was very tense. The Serbs were not enjoying our presence and the remaining Muslins had strong negative feelings for the UN, because the UN had failed them during that summer events.
We were having a sandwich lunch inside the car, close by the former Netherlands UNPROFOR compound, when we received a radio transmission instructing us to abort the mission and return to Sarajevo.
The journalist had been found alive and well in Budapest. Apparently he had contracted a Serbian interpreter, with a transportation included in the fee. He has tried several interviews but, because no one was collaborating with him, he decided to do a photo reportage of the Balkans and crossed the entire Bosnia territory, Croatia and Hungary.
I still remember my words when we reported back in HQ UNPROFOR – Sarajevo:
– “Goddammit! I´ve had enough. We were desperately looking for this guy while he was having a nice Gin tonic in a Danube boat?! In Budapest?! This is too much; please do not task me for any other stuff related with journalists.”
Our Deputy Commander, a UN veteran from Belgium, replied:
–“Caution Paulo; God is listening and He has a sense of humor; you may have to deal with journalists in the future.”
Three months later, after having redeployed to Portugal – Lisbon – the Air Force issued my new travel orders. I was to become the new Public Affairs and Media Relations Officer at the NATO HQ – CINCIBERLANT.
No one understood why I was laughing when I got those orders.
1 – Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined, caring, considerate, mature, respected and trusted soldier, displaying the highest integrity and impartiality. Have pride in your position as a peace-keeper and do not abuse or misuse your authority.
2 – Respect the law of the land of the host country, their local culture, traditions, customs and practices.
3 – Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy and consideration. You are there as a guest to help them and in so doing will be welcomed with admiration. Neither solicit or accept any material reward, honor or gift.
4 – Do not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and children.
5 – Respect and regard the human rights of all. Support and aid the infirm, sick and weak. Do not act in revenge or with malice, in particular when dealing with prisoners, detainees or people in your custody.
6 – Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment and property assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal benefits.
7 – Show military courtesy and pay appropriate compliments to all members of the mission, including other United Nations contingents regardless of their creed, gender, rank or origin.
8 – Show respect for and promote the environment, including the flora and fauna, of the host country.
9 – Do not engage in excessive consumption of alcohol or any consumption or trafficking of drugs.
10 – Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United Nations.
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