In 1992, due to the deteriorating security situation in the Balkans and the warlike acts perpetrated over the civilian population, the United Nations Security Council imposed an area of exclusion for non-authorized flights – commonly known as “No Fly Zone” (NFZ) – over Bosnia-Herzegovina and parts of Croatia (the Serbian Krajinas). The overall intention was to prevent the use of the Yugoslav Federal Army´s Air Power in the ongoing conflict.
In order to implement this flight prohibition, the UN gave a mandate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to survey and interdict those portions of airspace. To accomplish such a demanding task, NATO engaged fighter and surveillance aircraft which, in early 1995, had already made well over 60 000 sorties.
However, the UN also had its own air monitoring capability in place. UNPROFOR had a dedicated Airfield Monitors Branch, within the United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) Department.
The Airfield Monitor UNMO Teams were located in strategic points, in order to survey the air movements of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, the Croatian Air Force and the air components of the opposing forces in the Krajina and in Bosnia. These observations were, obviously, made with the consent of the local authorities. Therefore, there were UNPROFOR Airfield Monitor Teams physically present in the aeronautical installations, air bases and radar sites of the monitored entities.
One of the most important monitoring places, if not the most important places, to performance this surveillance, were the radar rooms of the civilian Air Traffic Control Centers (ACC) of both Croatia – in Zagreb – and Yugoslavia – in Belgrade.
The terminology of “No Fly Zone” was object of jokes between the Airfield Monitors. The word Fly (linked to the insect) could eventually mean that we were making sure that the airspace over Bosnia was clear of bugs.
With both NATO and the UN surveying the No Fly Zone, there was no way an aircraft could fly without being noticed … or so we thought. There were a lot of ways to avoid the radar coverage from up above and looking upwards, and the transgressor pilots knew all the tricks in the manual.
However, regardless the trespassing pilots’ skills, from January to July of 1995, the UNMO Airfield Monitor Team operating at the Belgrade Radar System reported 130 violations of the Fly Zone. Some of these reports could not be confirmed, but the majority of them were actually validated by other sources. These No Fly Zone violation reports ended over the desk of the UN Security Council, and contributed to the 1995 decision to extend the UN sanctions to Yugoslavia for an extra period of seven months.
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